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A PECULIAR PRIVILEGE IN IDSTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE: THE RIGHT TO REMAIN 
SILENT 
Albert W. Alschuler* 
I. !NTRODUCTION: Two VIEWS OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION 
Supreme Court decisions have vacillated between two incompati-
ble readings of the Fifth Amendment guarantee that no person "shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 1 The 
Court sometimes sees this language as affording defendants and sus-
pects a right to remain silent. This interpretation - a view that count-
less repetitions of the Miranda warnings have impressed upon the pub-
lic - asserts that government officials have no legitimate claim to 
testimonial evidence tending to incriminate the person who possesses it. 
Although officials need not encourage a suspect to remain silent, they 
must remain at least neutral toward her decision not to speak. In the Su-
preme Court's words, "[T]he privilege is fulfilled only when the person 
is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak 
in the unfettered exercise of his own will.' " 2 He must have a " 'free 
choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.' " 3 The Fifth Amend-
* Wilson-Dickinson Professor and Arnold E. Frieda Shure Scholar, The University 
of Chicago Law School. A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Harvard University. 
Matching the breadth and depth of Jerry Israel's knowledge of criminal procedure 
fortunately is not a prerequisite to publishing a paper in his honor. Neither is matching 
his wisdom, his thoroughness, his consistently sensible judgment, or the care, precision, 
and clarity of his words. As a scholar and educator, Jerry Israel gives brilliantly to the 
legal profession, and if the Michigan Law Review had not permitted less accomplished 
laborers to write for this issue, the issue would have been thin. 
I am grateful to the Leonard Sorkin Faculty Fund and the Sonnenschein Fund at 
The University of Chicago Law School for research support in the preparation of this 
article and to Penelope Bryan, George Fisher, Richard Helmholz, Dan Kahan, Nancy 
King, Daniel Klerman, John Langbein, Stephen Schulhofer, and Welsh White for com-
ments on an earlier draft. A different version of this article will appear in THE PRIVI-
LEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (R.H. 
Helmholz ed., forthcoming 1997). 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U.S. 1, 8 (1964)). 
3. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657 (1976) (quoting Lisenba v. 
California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941)). 
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ment dictates an "accusatorial system," one requiring "the government 
in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load. " 4 On this 
view, the concept of waiving the privilege seems unproblematic; one 
might waive a right to remain silent for many plausible reasons. 
On the Court's second interpretation, the Self-Incrimination Clause 
does not protect an accused's ability to remain silent but instead pro-
tects him only from improper methods of interrogation.5 This second in-
terpretation emphasizes the word "compelled," a word that appears 
upon first reading to express the Self-Incrimination Cl;mse's core con-
cept. In ordinary usage, compulsion does not encompass all forms of 
persuasion. A person can influence another's choice without compelling 
it; to do so she need only keep her persuasion within appropriate 
bounds of civility, fairness, and honesty. Compulsion is an open-ended 
concept encompassing only improper persuasive techniques. 6 On this 
4. Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting 8 JOHN 
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 2251, at 317 (John T. 
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
5. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 141-43 
(1993). 
6. Efforts to define compulsion and related words like coercion, duress, and invol-
untariness in terms of a subjective sense of constraint are unproductive. See ROBERT L. 
HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW 109-33 (1952). Consider, for example, the hypothet-
ical case of Adam, whose dentist recently sued him to recover fees for two dental 
procedures. 
The case began when Adam awoke one day with a toothache. He went to his den-
tist who pulled the tooth. Adam later refused to pay the dentist's bill, claiming that his 
contract with the dentist was involuntary. He said that his terrible toothache had denied 
him any choice in the matter. A judge rejected Adam's contention, and the dentist re-
covered her fee. 
The dentist, however, did not recover her fee for the second procedure. Immedi-
ately after her extraction of the tooth, she told Adam that his teeth needed cleaning. 
Adam replied that he did not want her to clean his teeth. The dentist then grabbed 
Adam's arm, pulled it behind his back, and twisted it hard. Adam screamed in pain, re-
considered his position, and asked the dentist to clean his teeth. He once more claimed 
that his contract with the dentist was involuntary, and this time, the judge agreed with 
him. 
Adam's twisted arm was, however, less painful than his aching tooth. His subjec-
tive sense of constraint - his sense that he had "no choice" but to employ the dentist 
- was stronger in the case he lost than in the case he won. The distinction between 
these cases rested on the fact that a wrongful human action had induced the second con-
tract but not the first. To speak of an overborne will or of an offer that one cannot re-
fuse usually does not help to resolve the issues in either dental cases or confession 
cases. A better focus is the propriety or impropriety of human influences on choice. Cf. 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) ("The sole concern of the Fifth 
Amendment ... is governmenial coercion."). 
An action appropriately judged coercive in one setting need not be judged coercive 
in another. Much depends on the purposes of the choice allegedly coerced, on the extent 
to which some assertedly coercive persuasive technique has subverted those purposes, 
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view of the self-incrimination privilege, the concept of waiver of the 
privilege becomes paradoxical. Although a defendant or suspect might 
sensibly waive a right to remain silent, few sane adults would waive a 
right to be free of compulsion.7 
The two opposing interpretations of privilege advance different in-
terests, 8 but the practical difference between them may not be enor-
mous. Like affording a right to silence, forbidding improper means of 
interrogation protects against torture, other abusive interrogation tech-
niques, and imprisoning someone for refusing to incriminate herself. 
The clash between the two interpretations centers mostly on whether a 
fact finder may appropriately treat the refusal of a suspect or defendant 
to speak as one indication of her guilt. Griffin v. California,9 in which 
the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment "forbids either com-
ment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the 
and on the strength of the affirmative reasons for permitting the challenged technique of 
persuasion. 
George Thomas and Marshall Bilder have noted that standard usage treats the 
words "compulsion" and "coercion" as essentially interchangeable. The words differ 
only because compulsion can arise from many sources while coercion is always the 
product of purposeful human activity: "While one would not say the sun coerced S into 
wearing a hat, ... one could quite comfortably say that the sun compelled S to wear a 
hat" George C. Thomas ill & Marshall D. Bilder, Criminal Law: Aristotle's Paradox 
and the Self-Incrimination Pu<.zle, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 257 & n.74 
(1991). In the context of the Fifth Amendment privilege (which limits the conduct of 
government officers and not of the sun), the difference between the two concepts seems 
unimportant 
Stephen Schulhofer once· wrote that "compulsion for self-incrimination purposes 
and involuntariness for due process purposes cannot mean the same thing." Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 435, 443 (1987). Schulhofer 
also has written, "The ... view ... that Fifth Amendment compulsion and due-process 
coercion are identical ... would ... make shreds of the entire fabric of Fifth Amend-
ment doctrine and tradition." Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Sub-
stantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 551 
(1996) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect]. Schulhofer recognized, 
however, that in ordinary usage "terms like coercion and compulsion have virtually in-
terchangeable meanings." Id. His point appeared to be that many Fifth Amendment rul-
ings have departed from the ordinary English-language meaning of the Constitution -
a point that scholars who disagree with Schulhofer undoubtedly would rush to embrace. 
See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interro-
gator and Modern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. REv. 662, 684-85 (1986). 
7. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 280-82 (1973) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 271 (1967); GRANO, supra note 5, at 
142. 
8. The "right to silence" ~nterpretation emphasizes safeguarding the privacy of in-
criminating information, tolerating the impulse of an accused person toward self-
preservation, and maintaining an "accusatorial" system. The "improper methods" in-
terpretation simply emphasizes treating suspects and defendants in a humane fashion. 
9. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
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court that such silence is evidence of guilt," 10 focused the choice be-
tween the two competing interpretations more sharply than any other 
Supreme Court decision has. 
Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Griffin invoked the language 
of unconstitutional conditions, declaring that comment "is a penalty im-
posed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down 
on the privilege by making its assertion costly." 11 Justice Stewart's dis-
senting opinion replied that "[c]ompulsion is the focus of the inquiry" 
and that "the Court in this case stretches the concept of compulsion be-
yond all reasonable bounds." '2 
Although the majority and dissenting justices in Griffin divided 
over which view of the Fifth Amendment privilege to endorse, the 
Court's opinion in Miranda v. Arizona13 the following year embraced 
both. The first Miranda warning - "You have a right to remain silent" 
- strongly indicated the Court's approval of the "right to silence" in-
terpretation of the Fifth Amendment. So did the Court's expansive ac-
cusatorial rhetoric14 and its demand for a knowing and intelligent 
10. 380 U.S. at 615. 
11. 380 U.S. at 614. The majority's reliance on the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions in Griffin was unnecessary. Rather than contend that prosecutorial comment 
burdens the exercise of a right to remain silent, the majority might have argued that 
comment on a defendant's silence violates the Fifth Amendment, pure and simple. 
When the defendant in Griffin refused to testify, the prosecutor invited a jury to in-
fer this defendant's consciousness of guilt and his knowledge of incriminating circum-
stances. The prosecutor thus converted even a silent defendant into a source of evidence 
against himself. The defendant might have avoided an unfavorable inference by speak-
ing, but if he had spoken, he would have been obliged to tell the truth. If the defendant 
were guilty, and possibly even if he were not, the truth would have been incriminating. 
The defendant in Griffin thus might have had no way to avoid incriminating himself; ei-
ther his truthful speech or his silence would have been treated as evidence of guilt. Be-
cause the defendant lacked an alternative, he was compelled to become a witness of 
sorts against himself. Cf. 380 U.S. at 613-14. 
Although this argument for the result in Griffin seems stronger than the argument 
based on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, both arguments depart from ordi-
nary concepts of morality, sensible criminal justice policy, and the historic understand-
ing of the Fifth Amendment privilege. The issue will be examined more fully in this 
article. 
12. 380 U.S. at 620 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart also wrote, "[l]f any 
compulsion be detected in the California procedure, it is of a dramatically different ... 
nature than that involved in the procedures which historically gave rise to the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee." 380 U.S. at 620 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
13. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) .. 
14. See, e.g., 384 U.S. at 460 (praising accusatorial procedure). 
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waiver of the privilege as a prerequisite to the admission of any state-
ment made by a suspect at the stationhouse. 15 
The Court, however, did not direct law enforcement officers to 
provide the Miranda warnings whenever they asked a person suspected 
of a crime to incriminate herself. Only suspects in custody were entitled 
to the warnings, 16 and the Court referred to the "inherently compelling 
nature" of custodial interrogation. This language and other aspects of 
the Miranda opinion - for example, the Court's discussion of the strat-
agems that interrogation manuals encouraged law enforcement officers 
to use while questioning suspects - suggested that the Court was still 
concerned with the quality and extent of the pressure brought to bear 
upon suspects and that the Fifth Amendment might not prohibit every 
inducement to speak. At the same time, much of the Court's discussion 
of stationhouse interrogation indicated that it was compelling only be-
cause it undercut the right to remain silent. A reader attempting to infer 
from Miranda whether the Fifth Amendment mandated neutrality to-
ward a suspect's decision to remain silent could become confused. 
No one really knows what Miranda means. In recent decades, the 
Supreme Court has insisted repeatedly th~t the "prophylactic Miranda 
warnings . . . are 'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution 
but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory 
self-incrimination [is] protected.' " 17 The Court thus has appeared to 
suggest that the Miranda warnings are not constitutionally required, but 
the Court plainly has no authority under the Constitution to reverse 
state court decisions that comply with federal law.18 The off-hand asser-
15. See 384 U.S. at 475 (declaring that "a heavy burden rests on the government 
to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege 
against self-incrimination"). 
16. See 384 U.S. at 444 & n.4. Two years before Miranda, Escobedo v. Illinois, 
378 U.S. 478 (1964), had indicated that warnings might be required when law enforce-
ment officers questioned any person upon whom suspicion had "focused" - in other 
words, whenever they asked a suspect to incriminate herself. If suspects have a right to 
remain silent, police interrogation asks them to waive this right whether they are in cus-
tody or not, and warnings could help to ensure that their waivers are knowing. The Su-
preme Court apparently required warnings only for suspects in custody because it con-
cluded that only suspects in custody were subject to compulsion. The Court's analysis 
therefore adhered at least nominally to the proposition that the privilege simply guards 
against compulsion; it does not guarantee every suspect, in custody or not, a right to re-
main silent. 
17. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 
417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)); see also; Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354 
(1994); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 
412, 424 (1986); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) ("[The Miranda exclu-
sionary rule] may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation."). 
18. See U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 2. 
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tion of a supervisory power over the administration of state criminal 
justice would have been startling, and one hesitates to attribute this as-
sertion to the Supreme Court. 19 The claim that the Miranda warnings 
were constitutionally required for prophylactic reasons, however, would 
have been less disturbing. As David Strauss has noted, the Supreme 
Court often has articulated prophylactic rules to increase the probability 
that America's constitutional law in action will correspond to its consti-
tutional law on parchment.20 Perhaps Miranda excludes uncompelled 
confessions in some cases to prevent compulsion in o~er cases,21 and 
perhaps the Miranda warnings advise suspects misleadingly that they 
have a right to remain silent in order to protect the different right that 
the Constitution guarantees them, the right to be free of compulsion.22 
The Miranda opinion gave at least lip service to the literal "com-
pulsion" interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. Post-Miranda deci-
sions, moreover, have permitted prison officials to treat a suspect's si-
lence as an indication of his guilt in prison disciplinary proceedings23 
and have allowed prosecutors to impeach the testimony of defendants at 
trial by showing their earlier failures to speak.24 Even after Griffin and 
19. The Miranda Court did indicate that the Constitution's requirement of pre-
interrogation warnings is changeable and contingent "[U)nless we are shown other pro-
cedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of si-
lence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards 
must be observed." 384 U.S. at 467. 
20. See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 
190 (1988). But see Joseph A. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A 
Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100 (1985) (arguing that judges 
generally lack the authority to· articulate prophylactic rules in constitutional litigation). 
21. Stephen Schulhofer has endorsed an alternative view of Miranda that seems 
more consistent with the opinion's language but that rests on a seemingly strained and 
extravagant proposition. In his view, Miranda held that in the absence of warnings any 
answer by a suspect in custody to a police question such as "Would you like to say 
anything?" or "Did you do it?" is in fact compelled. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Recon-
sidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435, 447 (1987) ("The Court held that the brief-
est period of interrogation necessarily will involve compulsion.") 
22. How Miranda warnings guard against abusive interrogation techniques, how-
ever, is unclear. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Those who use 
third-degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skill-
fully about warnings and waivers."). The Miranda opinion repeatedly voiced the as-
sumption that its holding would bring defense attorneys into police interrogation rooms 
in substantial numbers. The Court cliiimed that lawyers could guard against police 
abuse or at least report it See 384 U.S. at 470. The police, however, comply fully with 
Miranda by ceasing all interrogation when a suspect requests counsel. See 384 U.S. at 
474. Even in 1966, it should have been evident that a police officer would not ordina-
rily go to the trouble of arran~ng counsel for a suspect so that this lawyer could advise 
the suspect not to say anything. 
23. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-20 (1976). 
24. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (postarrest silence); Jenkins v. 
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (pre-arrest silence). But see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 
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Miranda, the privilege against self-incrimination does not entirely en-
sure suspects that they will not suffer adverse consequences for refusing 
to speak. The tension between the two interpretations of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege remains unresolved. 
This article argues that as embodied in the United States Constitu-
tion, the privilege against self-incrimination was not intended to afford 
defendants a right to remain silent or to refuse to respond to incriminat-
ing questions. Its purpose was to outlaw torture and other improper 
methods of interrogation. 
Part II of the article reviews some familiar moral objections to af-
fording suspects and defendants a broad right to silence and emphasizes 
the extent to which our current criminal justice system departs in prac-
tice from its professed accusatorial principles. Part m turns to history, 
tracing the path of the privilege from its possible origin 1500 years ago 
as a limitation on the scope of the religious obligation to confess 
through the decision in Miranda and beyond. 
Part III divides this history into three stages. It contends that the 
privilege enforced by seventeenth century common law courts against 
the English High Commission differed from the privilege that the fram-
ers included in the American Bill of Rights in 1791, and that neither the 
English nor the American version of the privilege afforded suspects and 
defendants a right to refuse to respond to incriminating questions. The 
right to remain silent emerged substantially after the framing of the Bill 
of Rights. Until the nineteenth century was well underway, magistrates 
and judges in both England and America expected and encouraged sus-
pects and defendants to speak during pretrial interrogation and again at 
trial. Fact finders did not hesitate to draw inferences of guilt when de-
fendants remained silent. The informal inducements of prenineteenth 
century trial procedure were, moreover, great enough that virtually 
every defendant did speak. 
At the same time, legal treatises and other sources in use at the 
time of the framing of the Bill of Rights declared incriminating ques-
tioning under oath an improper method of interrogation. They said that 
placing a suspect on oath was incompatible with his privilege, and they 
frequently analogized questioning under oath to torture.25 In accordance 
with the sentiments voiced by these authorities, courts in England and 
610 (1976) (maintaining that a suspect's silence following Miranda warnings may not 
be used to impeach him because the warnings themselves might have caused him to re-
main silent). 
25. See infra text accompanying notes 84-129. 
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America neither required nor permitted defendants to answer questions 
under oath.26 
The coercive power of an oath stemmed partly from its mystic and 
religious significance, a significance that modern observers may not 
fully appreciate. Even when judged solely in secular terms, however, 
oaths undoubtedly seemed coercive to the framers. Once a witness was 
placed on oath, her refusal to answer constituted contempt and was sub-
ject to c1jminal punishment. Her false answers constituted perjury. The 
witness ·could avoid punishment only by telling the truth, and when the 
truth was incriminating, she was therefore threatened with criminal pun-
ishment unless she condemned herself. That lawyers of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries regarded the threat of this punishment as com-
pulsion should not be at all surprising. 
A failure adequately to appreciate the distinction between sworn 
and unsworn statements led to slippage from the historic meaning of the 
privilege. Unlike an unsworn defendant, a witness who had been sworn 
and who was asked incriminating questions could refuse to respond. 
This sworn witness had a limited right to remain silent. If the witness 
chose to reveal incriminating information, moreover, she could fairly be 
said to have waived her privilege against self-incrimination. The objec-
tion to interrogating this witness rested on the compulsion effected by 
an improper technique of interrogation, however, and did not extend to 
all methods of encouraging suspects and defendants to speak. 
Language that appropriately described the situation of sworn wit-
nesses ultimately was extended to unsworn suspects, and the silence of 
these suspects came to be seen as a moral right. Where the Framers of 
the Constitution saw an obligation to the community to speak, later 
judges and scholars saw a right to refuse to cooperate in what they re-
garded as a poetic, inspiring contest between the individual and the 
state. 
The coercive power of the oath explains why prosecution wit-
nesses and civil litigants, who were sworn, invoked the privilege more 
fr~quently and more successfully than criminal defendants, who were 
not. It also explains why two groups of historians - those who have 
examined the rights of sworn witnesses and those who have examined 
the rights of criminal defendants - have asserted strikingly different 
dates for the origin of the privilege. 
Part IV of the article examines the relevance of this history to cur-
rent constitutional issues. 
26. See infra text accompanying notes 60-62, 77 & 137-50. 
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II. THE PuzzLING ETHICS OF THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 
In a classic article, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 
R. Kent Greenawalt discussed the ordinary morality of interrogating a 
person suspected of wrongdoing.27 Greenawalt drew a contrast between 
questioning on slender suspicion and questioning on solidly grounded 
suspicion, and he offered a number of illustrations of the moral differ-
ence between these two practices. 
When Ann has little basis for suspecting. that Betty has stolen her 
property, Greenawalt suggested that it would be insulting and unfair for 
Ann to ask Betty to account for her activities at the time of the theft. 
Betty might properly respond, "That's none of your business." If, how-
ever, a friend had told Ann that he had seen Betty wearing a distinctive 
bracelet like the one that Ann had reported stolen, then Ann might ap-
propriately describe the reason for her suspicion and ask Betty to ex-
plain. Ann's query would be less insulting and intrusive than most other 
means of confirming or dispelling her suspicion - surreptitiously 
watching Betty, searching her possessions, or interrogating her associ-
ates. In such circumstances, Betty would have powerful reasons for re-
sponding, and if she declined, Ann's suspicion could appropriately 
increase.28 
Although Greenawalt analyzed close personal relationships and 
less personal relationships separately, he concluded that the line be-
tween slight suspicion and well-grounded suspicion marked the bound-
ary between proper and improper questioning in both. In Greenawalt's 
view of ordinary morality, a person interrogated on slender suspicion 
may appropriately remain silent; a person questioned on well-grounded 
suspicion may not.29 
If the United States Constitution had adhered to Greenawalt's view 
of morality, the Fifth Amendment might have provided a limited right 
to silence comparable to the limited freedom from governmental 
searches and seizures afforded by the Fourth Amendment.30 The Fourth 
27. See R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. 
& MARYL. REV. 15 (1981). 
28. See id. at 20-26. 
29. See id. at 26-32. 
30. A common response to Greenawalt's argument is that private interrogation 
cannot be analogized to governmental interrogation because interrogation leading to a 
criminal conviction has substantially more severe consequences than questioning lead-
ing to a private sanction. See, .e.g., Myron Moskovitz, The 0.J. Inquisition: A United 
States Encounter with Continental Criminal Justice, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 1121, 
1140 (1995). Some private sanctions, however (for example, a discharge from employ-
ment), are more severe than some criminal sanctions (for example, unsupervised proba-
tion). More importantly, if someone is guilty of a crime, it seems as appropriate for the 
2634 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:2625 
Amendment provides only a qualified immunity from governmental in-
trusion - one that can be overcome by a showing of probable cause. 
The privilege afforded by the Fifth Amendment, however, is unquali-
fied. The Framers of the Constitution apparently concluded that no 
amount of evidence could justify compelling a person to supply testi-
monial evidence against herself in a criminal case. The Fourth Amend-
ment, which forbids only unreasonable searches and seizures, invites 
balancing. The Fifth Amendment does not. The Constitution says flatly 
that no person shall be compelled in any criminal cas~ to be a witness 
against himself.31 
Like a police search, governmental interrogation invades a sus-
pect's privacy and should not be permitted without antecedent justifica-
tion. A limited right to silence - one that could be overcome by a 
showing of probable cause - could easily be justified. As many writers 
have observed, however, the rationales that the Supreme Court has of-
fered for a more sweeping right to silence are unconvincing,32 and the 
government to punish her as for her employer to discharge her. Greenawalt's critics 
have not explained why a difference in the severity of the threatened sanction should 
cause a turnabout in the principles of justice that he articulated; these critics presumably 
do not contend that one should be privileged to frustrate deserved governmental punish-
ment but not deserved private punishment. Although the position of these critics reflects 
the almost intuitive liberal sense that the public and private realms are "just different," 
their argument seems seriously incomplete. 
31. But see California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1971) (opinion of Burger, C.J., 
joined by Stewart, White & Blackmun, JJ.) (endorsing balancing). 
32. For example, the Supreme Court once maintained that the privilege against 
self-incrimination expresses "our respect for the inviolability of the human personality 
and . . . the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private 
life.'" Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting United States v. 
Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956)). The Court has since recognized that 
the privilege protects privacy only haphazardly. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 
391, 400-01 (1976). Even the most expansive view of the privilege would not protect 
the privacy of an intimate diary that- contained no matter tending to incriminate its 
owner. If, however, the act of producing a grocery list or other impersonal document 
would tend to incriminate the person ordered to produce it, she need not respond. More-
over, a grant of immunity lifts the protection of the privilege altogether; with it, a per-
son can be forced to tell all. The privilege does not protect this person's privacy; it pro-
tects her only from being forced to incriminate herself. 
For convincing responses to most ~f the justifications that the Supreme Court has 
asserted for the privilege, see LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT? (1959); WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 59-76 
(1967); Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The 
Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857, 889-95 (1995); Donald A. Dripps, 
Against Police Interrogation ~ And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988); Donald A. Dripps, Self-Incrimination and Self-
Preservation: A Skeptical View, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 329; Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth 
Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671 
(1968); Charles T. McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility 
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more elaborate rationales offered by academic writers are similarly un-
persuasive.33 Accepting the common assumption that the privilege af-
fords a right to silence, Stephen Schulhofer recently wrote, "It is hard 
to find anyone these days who is willing to justify and defend the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. " 34 Akhil Amar and Renee Lettow ad-
ded, "Small wonder ... that the Self-Incrimination Clause - virtually 
alone among the provisions of the Bill of Rights - has been the target 
of repeated analytic assault over the course of the twentieth century 
from thoughtful commentators urging constitutional amendments to nar-
row it or repeal it altogether. " 35 
Although the Supreme Court has said that the privilege is the "es-
sential mainstay" of an accusatorial system36 and that it "requir[es] the 
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire 
load,"37 our legal system is substantially less accusatorial than this rhet-
oric suggests. The Supreme Court has required defendants to shoulder 
much of the load by producing incriminating documents,38 giving pre-
trial notice of defenses and of the evidence to be used to support 
of Confessions, 24 'TExAs L. REv. 239, 277 (1946); John H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur 
Seipsum Prodere, 5 HAR.v. L. REv. 71 (1891). 
33. For sophisticated defenses of the privilege, see Robert S. Gerstein, Privacy 
and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETHICS 87 (1970); Robert S. Gerstein, Punishment and Self-
lncrimination, 16 AM. J. Jurus. 84 (1971); Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: 
Self-Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 21 UCLA L. REv. 343 
(1979); William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1227 
(1988). For responses, see David Dolinko, ls There a Rationale for the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1063, 1122-37 (1986); Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 311, 320-21, 322-23 (1991). 
34. Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 311. For Schulhofer's justification and defense of 
the privilege - that it protects innocent defendants who might be unconvincing on the 
witness stand - see id. at 327-33. But see Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986) 
("The privilege against self-incrimination . . . is not designed to enhance the reliability 
of the factfinding determination .... "); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415-16 (1966) 
(refusing to apply Griffin v. California retroactively because "the basic purposes that lie 
behind the privilege against self-incrimination do not relate to protecting the innocent 
from conviction" and because "the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth"); Donald Dripps, Akhil 
Amar on Criminal Procedure and Co~titutional Law: "Here I Go Down That Wrong 
Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REv. 1559, 1631 (1996) (holding that although the privilege 
may benefit some innocent defendants, "[o]ne could say the same thing for a rule that 
bars the testimony of prosecution witnesses whose last names begin with the letter R"). 
35. Amar & Lettow, supra note 32, at 895. 
36. See Miranda v. Arizopa, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Tehan, 382 U.S. at 414; 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). 
37. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (citation omitted). 
38. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 
425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
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them,39 providing copies of defense investigative reports,40 and supply-
ing all forms of nontestimonial evidence - blood samples,41 voice sam-
ples,42 and even, in one case, the body of a child whom a suspect was 
thought to have killed. 43 
The virtues of an "accusatorial" system in which defendants are 
privileged to remain passive are far from obvious. The person who 
knows the most about the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant is 
ordinarily the defendant herself. Unless expecting her to respond to in-
quiry is immoral or inhuman - contrary to Greenawal.t's view of ordi-
nary morality - renouncing all claim to her evidence is costly and 
foolish.44 
39. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
40. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). 
41. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
42. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). 
43. See Baltimore Dept of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990). Al-
though the Court viewed the body of the suspected homicide victim as nontestimonial 
evidence, it recognized that the act of producing the body might supply testimonial evi-
dence that the Fifth Amendment would permit a suspect to withhold. In Bouknight it-
self, however, the Court declared the privilege unavailable because a court had adjudi-
cated the suspected homicide victim a child in need of assistance. His mother, the 
woman suspected of killing him, therefore held him only as a representative of the state. 
More than five years after the Supreme Court decision and more than seven years after 
Jacqueline Bouknight was imprisoned for failing to produce the body of her son 
Maurice, she was released from a Baltimore jail. See Mother Ends 7-Year Jail Stay, Still 
Silent About Missing Child, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1995, at A18. In our accusatorial sys-
tem, she had served more time for failing to produce evidence of the suspected but un-
proven killing than she would have served if she had been convicted of manslaughter. 
44. When one considers ·the issue as a matter of abstraction, the gain in human 
dignity afforded by a "right to silence may seem to justify the substantial burdens upon 
law enforcement that the right imposes. The balance, however, may appear more prob-
lematic when one focuses on a specific case. For example, shortly before midnight on 
May 26, 1996, a driver in Will County, Illinois, killed three teenage pedestrians, then 
left the scene of the accident Effective police work located the 1987 Chevy Blazer in-
volved in the accident, but its owner refused to speak to authorities about whether he or 
someone else had been driving the vehicle. See Jerry Shnay, More Charges Are 
Expected in Fatal Hit-And-Run, Cm. TRIB., June 7, 1996, at 1. One could imagine a 
case in which this refusal would make it impossible to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt the owner's guilt of any crime. In this situation, the owner's refusal to answer 
might seem more a triumph of incivility than a triumph of human dignity. One wonders 
whether the Constitution truly affords a suspect the right to thumb his nose at an ag-
grieved community in this fashion and: if it does, how the Framers could have viewed 
this right as noble and inspiring. 
Similarly, one wonders whether it would have been cruel or unfair to ask O.J. 
Simpson to explain the strong proof of guilt that prosecutors presented at his trial and to 
draw an inference adverse to S~mpson if he declined. Simpson's lawyers evidently con-
cluded that he would increase his chances of acquittal by not discussing before the jury 
why telephone company records indicated that he was making calls from his Bronco at 
a time when he claimed to have been at home, why he told the limousine driver who 
saw him enter his darkened doorway that he had been asleep, whether Nicole Simpson 
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Our legal system is in fact wise enough to reject in practice much 
of the accusatorial rhetoric it proclaims in theory. It actively seeks in-
criminating, testimonial evidence from the people it accuses of crime. 
Unfortunately, it often does so in troublesome ways. Every year, courts 
find that suspects in the back rooms of police stations have made multi-
tudes of knowing and intelligent waivers of their Fifth Amendment 
rights. If these suspects had understood their situations in the slightest 
degree, most of them would have remained silent.45 In addition, 92 per-
cent of all felony convictions in the United States are .by guilty plea.46 
Behind this figure lies the practice of plea bargaining. Prosecutors and 
other officials exert extraordinary pressure on defendants, not merely to 
obtain an answer, but to secure an unqualified admission of guilt. The 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines currently promise a substantially dis-
counted sentence to a defendant who supplies "complete information to 
the government concerning his own involvement in the offense. " 47 Few 
other nations are as dependent as ours on proving guilt from a defend-
ant's own mouth. 
No parent or schoolteacher feels guilty about asking questions of a 
child strongly suspected of misconduct. Similarly, no employer consid-
ers it improper to ask an employee accused of wrongdoing to give his 
side of the story. Criminal cases aside, there are apparently no investi-
gative or fact-finding proceedings in which asking questions and ex-
pecting answers is regarded as dirty business. Noting that "parents try 
hard to inculcate in their children the simple virtues of truth and respon-
sibility," Justice Walter V. Schaefer once wrote that "the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination ... runs counter to our ordi-
nary standards of morality. " 48 
had ever given him a pair of Aris lsotoner gloves, where he had been planning to go at 
the time of the chase that everyone watched on television, how his blood could have 
been found on his driveway before any blood sample had been obtained from him, and 
other troublesome, unresolved questions. 
The lawyers' judgment might well have been correct; Simpson probably improved 
his chances of acquittal by remaining silent. Encouraging jurors to use their common 
sense rather than the "artificial reason" of the law to assess the sounds of Simpson's si-
lence could conceivably have altered the outcome of the trial. 
45. For descriptions of the intimidating techniques used by police officers to ob-
tain confessions in the post-Miranda era. see DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON 
THE KILLING STREETS 199-220 (1991); Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police 
Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 LAW & SocY. REv. 259(1996). 
46. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS - 1994, at 486, tj:>l. 5.49 (1995) (NCJ-154591). 
47. U.S. SENTENCING COMMN., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 3.El.l(b)(l) (1995). 
48. SCHAEFER, supra note 32, at 59; see also Charles T. McCormick, Law and the 
Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 218, 222 (1956) ("Ordinary morality ... sees 
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People who regard criminal defendants as an appropriate source of 
evidence for resolving criminal disputes may wonder how the contrary 
position became, at least sometimes, a revered principle of American 
constitutional law.49 The common assumption that the privilege man-
dates an accusatorial system and forbids all efforts to induce a defend-
ant to reveal what she knows explains much of the persistent criticism 
of the privilege. This criticism and much other discussion of the privi-
lege, however, have rested on a historical misconception. The privilege 
in its inception was not intended to afford criminal def~ndants a right to 
refuse to respond to incriminating questions. Its purposes were far more 
limited. 
ill. A HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGE IN THREE Acrs 
The history of the modern privilege against self-incrimination can 
be divided roughly into three stages, each of them captured by its own 
distinctive formulation of the doctrine. At the earliest stage, the privi-
lege against self-incrimination was expressed in maxims like Nemo 
tenetur seipsum accusare ("No one shall be required to accuse him-
self") and Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum ("No one shall be required to 
produce himself" or "No one shall be required to betray himself"). At 
the second stage, the formulation was that of the United States Consti-
tution: No person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself." At the third stage (the modern stage), the warn-
ings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona express the general although not 
universal understanding of the privilege: "You have a right to remain 
silent." These formulations often are treated as equivalent, but they are 
very different. 
A. Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum 
As Richard Helmholz has demonstrated, the roots of the privilege 
in the early seventeenth century are to be found, not in the common law 
of England, but in the ius commune - the law applied throughout the 
European continent and in the English prerogative and ecclesiastical 
courts.50 When seventeenth century common law courts restricted the 
power of the High Commission. to ask incriminating questions of sus-
nothing wrong in asking a man, for adequate reason, about particular misdeeds of which 
he has been suspected and charged .... I predict that the weaknesses of the privilege in 
point of policy and morality will become more widely understood."). 
49. Champions of the right to remain silent may wonder about it too. 
50. See R.H. Helmholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The 
Role of the European Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1990). 
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pected religious dissenters, these courts were, for the most part, requir-
ing the Commission to adhere to law that it purported to observe. 
Several maxims of the ius commune expressed its most important 
limitation on interrogation. fu addition to the familiar nemo tenetur 
maxim given above, the ius commune made use of two more: Nemo 
punitur sine accusatore ("No one is punished in the absence of an ac-
cuser") and Nemo tenetur detegere turpitudinem suam ("No one is 
bound to reveal his own shame").51 
The principle reflected in these maxims Was unknown in classical 
Roman law,52 and when it entered the ius commune is uncertain. A 
plausible hypothesis is that the privilege began as a limitation upon the 
religious duty to confess.53 By the third century, penance for wrongdo-
ing was an obligation of Christian faith,54 and the penance occurred in 
public. Whether this penance generally included a public confession, or 
whether, instead, private confession preceded public penance is a matter 
of dispute,55 but the Church ultimately demanded only private (auricu-
51. Id. at 975, 981. 
52. See MAx RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 468 (1927). Early Jewish 
law, however, forbade nearly all self-incriminating testimony and excluded nearly all 
self-incriminating out-of-court statements. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE 
FIFrH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 433-41 (2d ed. 
1986); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, The Talmidic Rule Against Self-
lncrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 955 (1988). 
53. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 32, at 896. 
54. Earlier, the church may not have recognized any sacrament for the remission 
of sins other than baptism. See M. Joseph Costelloe, Penitential Controversy, in 3 EN-
CYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF RELIGION 2721, 2722 (Paul Kevin Meagher et al. eds., 
1979); L. Michael White, Penance, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY 708 
(Everett Ferguson ed., 1990). 
55. Compare R.S.T. HASLEHURST. SOME ACCOUNT OF THE PENITENTIAL DIS-
CIPLINE OF THE EARLY CHURCH IN THE FmsT FOUR CENTURIES 100 (1921) (recit-
ing substantial circumstantial evidence that confession in the early Church was public) 
and J.N.D. KELLY, EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES 216 (5th ed. 1977) (noting that in 
the third century penitential. discipline "was wholly public, involving confession, a pe-
riod of penance and exclusion from communion, and formal absolution and restora-
tion") and 1 HENRY CHARLES LEA, A HISTORY OF AURICULAR CONFESSION AND 
INDULGENCES IN THE LATIN CHURCH 217 (1968) (1896) ("[D]uring the early centu-
ries the only confession recognized by the Church was . . . made by the sinner in the 
congregation of the faithful, unless, indeed, he might be on trial before his bishop and 
then it was public in the episcopal court. . . . ") and Eugene La Verdiere, Confession of 
Sin, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARL y CHRISTIANITY, supra note 54, at 223, 224 ("By 
the fifth century, the practice of public confession had been replaced by private confes-
sion •••. ") with JOSEPH A. FAVAZZA, THE ORDER OF PENITENTS: HISTORICAL 
ROOTS AND PASTORAL FlJTllRE 214-17 (1988) (noting that in the third century pri-
vate confession to a priest was followed by public confession that was liturgical rather 
than informative) and John Halliburton, 'A Godly Discipline': Penance in the Early 
Church, in CONFESSION AND ABSOLUTION 40, 45 (Martin Dudley & Geoffrey Rowell 
eds., 1990) ("Those who write of 'public confession' in the early Church normally fail 
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lar) confession. The fourth century Church leader St. John Chrysostom 
wrote, "I do not say that you should betray yourself in public nor ac-
cuse yourself before others, but that you obey the prophet when he said, 
Reveal your ways unto the Lord."56 Chrysostom's statement was cited 
centuries later as a justification for the nemo tenetur principle.57 The 
fifth century historian Sozomen explained: 
[l]n seeking pardon it is necessary to confess the sin; and since from the 
beginning the bishops decided, as is only right, that it was too much of a 
burden to announce one's sins as in a theater with the congregation of the 
Church as witness, they appointed for this purpose a presbyter, a man of 
the best refinement, a man silent and prudent. To him sinners came and 
confessed their deeds .... ss 
Far from reflecting the notion that wrongdoers have a right to re-
main silent, the privilege against self-incrimination originally may have 
reflected only a pragmatic judgment that a sinner's duty did not include 
a public disclosure that might lead to criminal proceedings. To demand 
either public disclosure or submission to criminal punishment would 
have diminished the willingness of wrongdoers to confess, and confes-
sion, not silence, was good for the soul. 
By the seventeenth century, the privilege had grown into a right 
not to be interrogated under oath in the absence of well-grounded suspi-
cion. All of the formulations of the nemo tenetur principle in the ius 
commune were consistent with the concepts of ordinary morality voiced 
by Kent Greenawalt. They concerned the initiation of criminal proceed-
to distinguish between the tenns 'exhomologesis' and 'confessio.' ") and Confession, 
Auricular, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF RELIGION, supra note 54, at 868 
("More recent historians of penance are in general agreement that public confession 
was never obligatory in the early Church, although penitents may well have confessed 
publicly the major sins for which they were doing penance.") and Rights and Ceremo-
nies, in 26 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 790 (15th ed. 1993) (noting that 
in the third century, when penitential exercises included fasting, wearing sackcloth, ly-
ing in ashes, and other fonns of mortification, "[d]etails of the sins committed were 
confessed in secret to a priest, who then pronounced absolution and imposed an appro-
priate penance"). 
56. Helmholz, supra note 50, at 982 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57. See id. Chrysostom also wrote, "[l]f a man hasten to confess his crimes and 
show the ulcer to a doctor, who will heal and not reproach, and receive the medicines 
from him, and speak with him alone, no one else knowing of it, and carefully tell him 
all, he shall easily be quit of his sin." HASLEHURST, supra note 55, at 101 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
58. Confession, Auricular, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF RELIGION, 
supra note 54, at 868 (intern\tl quotation marks omitted). Cyril of Jerusalem wrote, 
"[T]he Master .... saith, 'I do not compel thee to come into the midst of the theatre, 
in the presence of many witnesses: tell the sin to Me, alone, and in private, that I may 
heal the sore.' " HAsLEHURST, supra note 55, at 102 (collecting similar sources at 100-
05) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ings, declaring that a person could not be required to "accuse" or "pro-
duce" or "betray" himself.59 No person could be required to "reveal" 
his own wrongdoing. There must instead be an "accuser," someone 
other than the defendant who had revealed or asserted the defendant's 
crime. Officials must not commence prosecutions by interrogating at 
large, by conducting fishing expeditions, or by questioning on what 
Greenawalt would call slender suspicion. Officials in the seventeenth 
century and earlier were expected to have probable cause before asking 
suspects to respond under oath to incriminating questions. 
Unlike the common law courts of the seventeenth century, which 
did not permit criminal defendants and other litigants to testify under 
oath, the High Commission required parties to swear to answer truth-
fully all questions that the court might put to them. The High Commis-
sion often did so, moreover, without specification of the charges against 
a suspect or notification of the questions to be asked. 60 When litigants 
challenged the High Commission's power to administer the ex officio 
oath, they did so primarily on the ground that the ius commune did not 
permit judges to commence ex officio procedures. Unless someone with 
an interest in securing the defendant's conviction had accused her or 
other strong evidence of her guilt appeared, interrogation of the defend-
ant under oath was improper.61 
The difference between the procedures of the High Commission 
and other ecclesiastical courts, in all of which defendants were sworn to 
tell the truth, and those of common law courts, in which defendants 
often spoke but were disqualified from testifying under oath, is impor-
tant in understanding . the history of the privilege against self-
incrimination. The history of the privilege, from the struggles over the 
authority of the High Commission through at least the framing of the 
59. Wigmore wrote, "The whole rule was embodied in the maxim, 'Licet nemo 
tenetur seipsum prodere, tamen proditus per famam tenentur seipsum prodere, tamen 
proditus per famam tenetur seipsum ostendere utrum possit suam innocentiam ostendere 
et seipsum purgare.' " He translated this sentence as, "Though no one is bound to be-
come his own accuser, yet when once a man has been accused (pointed at as guilty) by 
general report, he is bound to show whether he can prove his innocence and to vindi-
cate himself." Wigmore concluded, "Prodere was used in the sense of 'to disclose for 
the first time,' 'to reveal what was before unknown.' The whole maxim, far from estab-
lishing a privilege of refusing to answer, expressly declares that answers must be given 
under certain conditions . . . . " Wigmore, supra note 32, at 83-84. For two relatively 
minor corrections of Wigmore's translation, see Helen Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE 
LJ. 1329, 1367 (1959). See also LEVY, supra note 52, at 95-96; 8 WIGMORE, supra 
note 4, § 2250, at 267 n.l, 275.-76. 
60. See Charles M. Gray, Prohibitions and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, in TUDOR RULE AND REVOLUTION 345, 355 (Delloyd J. Guth & John 
W. McKenna eds., 1982). 
61. See Helmholz, supra note 50, at 975-76. 
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American Bill of Rights, is almost entirely a story of when and for what 
purposes people would be required to speak under oath. 62 
In preliterate societies and, to a lesser extent, in societies in which 
a substantial portion of the population remains illiterate, oaths are the 
primary means of solemnizing and memorializing important statements 
and transactions. In these societies, oaths are sometimes accompanied 
by the sacrifice and dismemberment of animals to make the oaths vivid 
and also to symbolize the fate awaiting people who default on sworn 
obligations.63 God's third commandment to the Israelites was, "Thou 
shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. " 64 
The Book of Matthew includes Christ's condemnation of oaths,65 
but the leaders of the early Christian Church, prompted in part by social 
need, concluded that Christ's statement was not meant literally. These 
leaders pointed to oaths taken by Abraham,66 St. Paul,67 and even God68 
in support of their position. Some later Christians, however, including 
some of the seventeenth century religious dissenters who resisted the ex 
officio oath, took Christ at his word. They conscientiously opposed all 
oaths. 
Oaths were "the institutional glue par excellence" of the medieval 
Church, and a sixteenth century treatise listed 174 ways in which they 
62. As late as 1886 in fact, the Supreme Court wrote: 
[A]ny compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath ... to convict him of 
crime ... is contrary to the principles of a free government It is abhorrent to the 
instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may 
suit the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of 
political liberty and personal freedom. 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886). 
63. See Doctrines and Religious Dogmas, in 11 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, supra note 55, at 422. Fifteen centuries before Christ, a cuneiform tablet 
depicted Mithra, the most important god of pre-Zoroastrian Iran, as the god of oaths. 
See Mithraism, in 8 id. at 197. See generally Silving, supra note 59. The Book of Gene-
sis reported two promissory oaths taken by placing a hand upon the promisee's genitals. 
See Genesis 24:2-9; Genesis 47:29-31. 
64. Exodus 20:7 (King James); see also Deuteronomy 5:11; Leviticus 19:12. 
65. In the Sermon on the Mount, Christ said: 
Again, you have heard that it was said to the people long ago, "Do not break 
your oath, but keep the oaths you h~ve made to the Lord." But I tell you, Do not 
swear at all: either by Heaven, for it is God's throne; of by the earth, for it is his 
footstool; or by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the Great King. And do not swear 
by your head, for you cannot make even one hair white or black. Simply let your 
"Yes" be "Yes," and your "No," "No"; anything beyond this comes from the 
evil one. . 
Matthew 5:33-37 (New Am. Bible, rev. ed.). 
66. See Genesis 21:23-24. 
67. See 2 Corinthians 1:23. 
68. See Isaiah 62:8. 
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had special significance in the ius commune. 69 Their mystic power was 
great enough that in church courts, and even at an early stage in the 
King's courts, they sometimes were treated as conclusive proof. A 
defendant could swear his innocence and produce the number of com-
purgatores or "oath-helpers" that the court required. Once the compur-
gatores swore that they believed the defendant's oath, he was, without 
more, acquitted.70 By the seventeenth century, however, far from treat-
ing a criminal defendant's oath as conclusive, common law courts 
neither required nor permitted criminal defendants to swear to the truth 
of their statements. In assessing the coercive power of an oath in that 
century, one must recall the spirit of the age. It was still a time when 
questions about whether bread and wine became Christ's body and 
blood or instead merely symbolized them were matters over which men 
willingly fought and died.71 
69. The quoted phrase, and some of what follows, are taJcen from R.H. HELM-
HOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW (forthcoming 1996), making use of 
PAOLO PRODI, IL SACRAMENTO DEL POTERE: IL GIURAMENTO POLmco NELLA 
STORIA COSTITUZIONALE DELL'0CCIDENTE (1992). 
70. Compurgation as a mode of trial in common law criminal cases did not sur-
vive the Assize of Clarendon in 1166. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO EN-
GLISH LEGAL HISTORY 578 (3d ed. 1990). It persisted, however, as a mode of trial in 
some civil cases until 1602. See id. at 389-94. 
71. William J. Stuntz's recent account of the history of the privilege attaches less 
significance to oaths than this article does. Although Stuntz recognizes that "people [in 
the seventeenth century] took oaths and swearing a good deal more seriously than they 
might today," he commented that: "[l]t is hard to believe that the sustained criticism of 
the oath ex officio rested primarily on the cruelty of the choice it posed; after all, this 
was an era when real racks, not metaphorical ones, were employed with some regular-
ity." William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 
393, 412-13 (1995). 
Stuntz probably overestimated the brutality of English criminal procedure, how-
ever; in England, the rack was never employed with regularity. On occasion, the En-
glish Privy Council ordered torture for reasons of state, but its goal usually was to gain 
information and intelligence about an ongoing conspiracy rather than to gain a confes-
sion for judicial use. Torture, a recognized part of Continental criminal procedure, sim-
ply had no place in the English common law. Moreover, the last case of officially sanc-
tioned torture in England occurred in 1640, and the use of torture had been very 
infrequent in the preceding decades. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE 
LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE ANCIEN REGIME 73-123 (1977). 
Stuntz's account of the privilege distinguished between cases of religious persecu-
tion and "ordinary" criminal cases. This distinction was indeed significant, and the rev-
erence accorded the privilege today is undoubtedly attributable in part to the fact that its 
initial champions were courageous defenders of the right to religious freedom rather 
than murderers, rapists, and highwaymen. 
Stuntz's version of the ta],e, however, seems flawed. As he told it, the privilege, 
theoretically available to defendants in both heresy and "ordinary" criminal cases, was 
meaningless in the ordinary cases. Most of these cases were effectively resolved by pre-
trial questioning, and "the privilege was a trial right. It did not affect pretrial question-
ing, which was not conducted under oath." Stuntz, supra, at 416. Stuntz may have been 
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To the charge that use of the ex officio oath was unlawful without 
an accuser, defenders of the High Commission responded that Jama 
publica (public fame) could take the place of an accuser. Some authori-
ties disputed this proposition, and the sources that recognized a Jama 
publica exception to the requirement of an accuser emphasized that ru-
mor alone was not enough: 
The fame had to have been the true source of the prosecution; it must not 
have had its origins simply in malicious rumor-mongering by the ene-
mies of the accused. Moreover, before proceedings could begin, the exis-
tence of public fame had to be proved by the testimony' of trustworthy 
persons. It could not simply be assumed to exist. Fi,nally, the public fame 
had to be so vehement that scandal would be generated by failure to take 
action upon it.72 
Under the ius commune, the propriety of inquisition before the 
High Commission thus turned upon the proper application of the princi-
ples of morality that Kent Greenawalt articulated more than 300 years 
later.73 Disputants considered what sort of antecedent justification the 
law required before the High Commission could administer the ex of-
ficio oath and ask questions. Once an appropriate preliminary showing 
had been made, suspects were required to submit to the oath and to 
answer.74 
unaware that the questioning of common law defendants at trial also was not under 
oath; the privilege was as unavailable to defendants at trial as it was during their pretrial 
interrogation. 
Stuntz's account failed to· consider the fact that heresy and "ordinary" cases were 
tried in different courts using different procedures; this fact, more than any other, ac-
counted for their different histories. Contrary to Stuntz's hypothesis, the use of oaths in 
religious courts initially prompted common law enforcement of the privilege. The con-
cern voiced about .the coercive character of these oaths was not merely a cover. 
72. Helmholz, supra note 50, at 977-78 (citation omitted). 
73. Although the defenders of the High Commission argued that the Commission's 
actions were warranted by the ius commune, they also maintained that a royal commis-
sion, authorized by the Act of Supremacy of 1559, exempted the High Commission 
from the requirements that the ius commune imposed on other religious courts. See id. 
at 977, 978-79. 
74. Some suspects who submitted to the ex officio oath objected later to answering 
particular questions. These suspects asserted essentially the same principles as those 
who challenged the authority of the High Commission to administer the oath initially. 
Helmholz reports that they were required to answer when 
there was public knowledge that a crime had been committed ... the public had 
an interest in punishing the crime, and ... there were legitimate indicia that the 
defendant being questioned .had committed it. This was an accepted principle in 
the criminal law. Following its mandate, under principles of the ius commune, de-
fendants had no right to refuse . . . to answer specific questions about their 
crimes. 
Id. at 983 (footnotes omitted). 
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Critics of the High Commission sometimes objected to its proce-
dures for reasons other than the lack of a sufficient evidentiary basis for 
questioning. For one thing, they argued that forcing people to answer 
incriminating questions under oath tempted them to commit perjury.75 
This objection would have been as forceful in cases of questioning on 
strong suspicion as in cases of questioning on light suspicion. When de-
fendants testify under oath, an objection to forcing them to choose 
among perjury, contempt, or self-accusation - a choice that the Su-
preme Court has called a "cruel trilemma"76 - has the potential of cre-
ating a broader privilege than the privilege of insisting on an adequate 
evidentiary foundation for questioning. This objection appears to con-
demn forcing people to answer incriminating questions under oath 
altogether. 
Something like this objection may have been among the circum-
stances that led common law courts to disqualify criminal defendants 
and other interested parties from providing sworn testimony - testi-
mony that, if false, might have jeopardized their souls.77 In the ius com-
75. Id. at 982. 
76. The Supreme Court referred to the "cruel trilemma" as a justification for the 
privilege in Murphy v. Waterfront Comnm., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). As Helmholz 
notes, the phrase antedated this opinion. See Helmholz, supra note 50, at 983 n.101. 
The word "trilemma" does not appear in most dictionaries, but the Oxford English Dic-
tionary notes uses of the word in 1672, 1690, 1725, 1860, and 1887. See 18 THE OX-
FORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 530-31 (2d ed. 1989). 
77. That the common law's testimonial disqualification was a "disqualification" 
and not a "privilege" might lead a modem observer to conclude that the disqualifica-
tion was not intended to benefit the defendants. Being "disqualified" from doing some-
thing that other people do does not sound like a favor. Nevertheless, one should resist 
this conclusion. The testimonial disqualification of defendants served several purposes, 
one of which was to safeguard the defendants themselves. 
The primary purpose of the disqualification probably was to keep untrustworthy 
evidence from the trier of fact. See Rules of Evidence, No. Ill, Incompetency of Witness 
from Interest, 6 AM. JURIST 18 (1831). In addition, the disqualification saved juries 
from the disturbing task of resolving swearing contests, contests that would have re-
vealed the imperfection of the oath as a guarantor of truth. See Letter from George 
Fisher to author, June 6, 1996 (noting that common law procedure used several devices 
to avoid sworn credibility conflicts and suggesting that "our system only quite recently 
became comfortable with the idea that a jury could resolve credibility conflicts between 
sworn witnesses"). 
Finally, the disqualification protected defendants. Whatever the law on the subject, 
the exercise of a privilege not to testify is likely to give rise to an unfavorable infer-
ence, and the temptation to commit perjury rather than to invoke this privilege is likely 
to be strong. Only an unyielding disqualification ensures that the government will not 
lead defendants to swear falsely and, perhaps, to condemn themselves to damnation. See 
infra text accompanying notes 140-47 (describing nineteenth-century opposition to abo-
lition of the testimonial disqualification on these grounds). 
One cannot know whether the goal of safeguarding defendants and, initially, other 
interested witnesses was among those prompting their disqualification or whether this 
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mune, however, the objection did not lead either to testimonial disquali-
fication or to the establishment of a privilege of sworn witnesses always 
to decline to answer incriminating questions. Interrogation under oath 
remained permissible so long as public fame or an identified accuser 
provided an adequate evidentiary foundation. 
During this early era, the discomfort generated by forcing suspects 
to answer under oath was great enough that the ius commune exempted 
false answers to incriminating questions from the penalties for perjury. 
False answers still were punishable as contempt, however, and in the 
seventeenth century, the temporal penalties for perjury were not the 
most important ones. Although critics of the High Commission objected 
that the moral trilemma confronting sworn suspects remained, this ob-
jection did not lead common law courts to prohibit involuntary adminis-
tration of the ex officio oath by the Commission.78 
Another, more technical objection to questioning by the High 
Commission found greater favor in the common law courts. These 
courts forbade questioning by the Commission that could effectively re-
solve either a civil or a criminal case that the common law courts had 
jurisdiction to decide.79 Other privileges were available to suspects 
brought before the Commission as well, including a privilege not to be 
questioned concerning "secret thoughts. " 80 No suspect, however, suc-
cessfully asserted an unqualified privilege to refuse to respond to in-
criminating questions. 
Charles Gray describes a habeas corpus action brought by 
Maunsell and Ladd in 1607 as "[t]he most concerted assault ever made 
on inquisition of any sort by any court."81 In this case, two Puritan sus-
pects who had been brought before the High Commission challenged 
the court's authority to ask incriminating questions, and they lost. Their 
case established the propriety of the Commission's interrogation under 
oath when (1) the case was within the High Commission's jurisdiction, 
(2) the Commission's questioning did not expose the person interro-
purpose was a rationalization and an afterthought. Common law sources, however, as-
serted this rationale for refusing to permit defendants to testify at least as early as the 
late sixteenth century. See infra text accompanying notes 84-94. 
78. See Helmholz, supra note 50, at 982-83, 985-86. 
79. See Gray, supra note 60, at 355. 
80. See id. at 360; Of Oaths before an Ecclesiastical Judge ex Officio, 12 Coke's 
Rep. 26 (3d ed. 1727), 77 Eng. Rep. 1308 (1606); Edwards's Case, 13 Coke's Rep. 9 
(3d ed. 1727), 77 Eng. Rep. 1421, 1422 (K.B. 1609); LEVY, supra note 52, at 245-46 
(discussing Edwards's Case, and Jenner's Case, Stowe MS. 424, fols. 159b-160a 
(1611)). 
81. Gray, supra note 60, at 360-61. 
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gated to a risk of detriment in a common law proceeding, and (3) the 
Commission gave sufficient notice of the subject of its interrogation. 
In summary, the common law courts enforced more than one privi-
lege against the High Commission, but all of these privileges were com-
patible with the principles of ordinary morality articulated by Kent 
Greenawalt. The most important of these privileges - the privilege not 
to be subjected to incriminating interrogation under oath until a specific 
accuser or public fame provided a clear basis for suspicion - was in 
fact grounded on precisely the moral principles that Oreenawalt later 
voiced. 
B. No Person Shall Be Compelled in Any Criminal Case To Be a 
Witness Against Himself 
The privilege against self-incrimination that the Framers included 
in the Bill of Rights of 1791 differed from the privilege that the English 
common law courts enforced against the High Conµnission. The Fifth 
Amendment, declaring that no person shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself, plainly refers, not just to the 
initiation of criminal proceedings or to a first accusation, but to the con-
duct of the criminal trial. 
By the time a felony defendant reaches trial, a strong basis for sus-
pecting his guilt ought to be apparent,82 and a privilege afforded to de-
fendants who have been placed on trial after a showing of probable 
cause goes beyond Greenawalt's principles of morality. Unlike the lim-
ited privilege of the ius commune, the Fifth Amendment's privilege was 
not designed merely to guarantee an adequate evidentiary basis for in-
terrogation. The Constitution affords an absolute privilege, one that no 
evidentiary showing can overcome. 83 
82. The Fifth Amendment not only sets forth the privilege against self-
incrimination but also provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous, crime unless upon presentment or indictment by a Grand Jury." 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
83. In one respect, however, the Fifth Amendment's formulation of the privilege is 
narrower than the maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum. The Fifth Amendment speaks 
only of compulsion to be a witness in a criminal case, but the older maxim could be in-
voked successfully when there was no ask of criminal punishment but merely a risk of 
civil liability or of injury to reputation. See, e.g., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 
422, 449-54 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 631-35 
(1896) (Field, J., dissenting); Respublica v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates 429, 437 (Pa. 1802); LEVY, 
supra note 52, at 423-24, 427;_ ZEPHANIAH SWIFr, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVI-
DENCE IN CIVIi.. AND CRIMINAL CASES 77 (Hartford, Oliver D. Cooke 1810) ("It is a 
rule of evidence in civil cases, that no man is compellable to testify against his interest, 
or to answer any question that will render him liable to an action, charge him with a 
debt, or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture."); id. at 79-80 ("A witness is not bound 
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In assessing what this constitutional privilege meant to the people 
who enacted it, manuals used to instruct justices of the peace on the 
conduct of their offices offer a helpful starting point. For nearly 300 
years, from 1584 through the mid-nineteenth century, these manuals de-
clared that the nemo tenetur principle precluded the interrogation of 
suspects under oath.84 One of the most frequently used manuals in colo-
nial America, Dalton's Countrey Justice, first published in England in 
1618, declared, "The offender himself shall not be examined upon oath; 
for by the common law, Nullus tenetur seipsum prodere."85 
A manual published in 17 45 explained: 
The Law of England is a Law of Mercy, and does not use the Rack or 
Torture to compel Criminals to accuse themselves .... I take it to be for 
the same Reason, that it does not call upon the Criminal to answer upon 
Oath. For, this might serve instead of the Rack, to the Consciences of 
some Men, although they have been guilty of Offences .... The Law has 
to answer questions, the direct object and immediate tendency of which are to degrade, 
disgrace, and disparage the witness, and shew his turpitude and infamy .... "); Law-
rence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory 
Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part I), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 
164 & n.336 (1992); Wigmore, supra note 32, at 85. 
84. For what may be the earliest example, see ANTHONY FITZHERBERT & RICH· 
ARD COMPTON, L'OFFICE ET AUCTHORITIE DE JUSTICES DE PEACE 152 (P.R. 
Glazebrook ed., 1972) (1584). 
For obvious reasons early champions of the privilege against self-incrimination 
rarely argued that statements made under oath were less reliable than unswom state-
ments. Nevertheless, Akhil Amar and Renee Lettow, contending that the historic pur-
pose of the privilege was to protect against the use of unreliable evidence, recently pro-
posed a procedure that they called "a solution remarkably like the early scope of the 
privilege." Amar & Lettow, supra note 32, at 898. Amar and Lettow would permit 
prosecutors to take the depositions of criminal suspects under oath. "The penalty for re-
fusing to answer would be contempt, and the penalty for lying would be perjury." Id. at 
898-99 (footnotes omitted). Although prosecutors would not be allowed to use the sus-
pects' statements against them at trial, they would be permitted to introduce evidence 
derived from these statements - both physical evidence and the testimony of witnesses 
whose existence, location, and identity the suspects had disclosed. This solution "re-
markably like the early scope of the privilege" seems more closely to resemble the evil 
that the privilege was intended to remedy. See Dripps, supra note 34, at 1565-66, 1623-
35 (offering a powerful - indeed overwhelming - rejoinder to Amar and Lettow's 
historical account, suggesting that Amar and Lettow have it backwards, and demonstrat-
ing the odd incentives that Amar and Lettow's proposal would create for law enforce-
ment officers). For a discussion of how sharply Amar and Lettow's proposal departs 
from a century of more recent history, see Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda 
Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REv. 929 
(1995). For Amar and Lettow's rejoinder, see Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, 
Self-Incrimination and the Constitution: A Brief Rejoinder to Professor Kamisar, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 1011 (1995). 
85. MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE 273 (Professional Books 1973) 
(1619). 
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therefore wisely and mercifully laid down this Maxim, Nemo tenetur 
seipsum prodere. 86 
Nineteenth-century American manuals substituted the language of 
the Bill of Rights for the familiar Latin maxim: 
No man shall be compelled to give evidence against himself. Hence it is 
held that if a criminal be sworn to his examination taken before a justice, 
it shall not be read against him.87 
The prisoner is not to be examined on oath, fo~ this would be a species 
of duress, and a violation of the maxim, that no one is bound to crimi-
nate himself. 88 
All of these manuals noted the coercive force of an oath (a force 
derived from both the secular penalties for perjury and the supernatural 
sanctions for falsely invoking God's name), and they linked the disqual-
ification of suspects and defendants from testifying under oath to the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
The claim that incriminating interrogation under oath is forbidden 
for the same reason that torture is forbidden was asserted by religious 
dissenters in England and embraced by religious dissenters in America. 
In about 1591, Thomas Cartwright and eight Puritan colleagues ob-
jected that the ex officio oath "put the conscience uppon the racke. " 89 
In 1637 John Lilburne declared before the Star Chamber that "no 
man[']s conscience ought to be racked by oaths imposed. " 90 Five years 
later in the winter of 1641-1642, the governor of the Plymouth Colony 
asked the colony's ministers and magistrates "[h]ow far a magistrate 
may extract a confession from a delinquent to accuse himself of a capi-
tal crime seeing nemo tenetur prodere seipsum. " 91 One of the three sur-
86. THEODORE BARLOW, THE JUSTICE OF PEACE: A TREATISE CONTAINING 
THE POWER AND DUIT OF THAT MAGISTRATE 189 (London, Henry Lintot 1745), 
quoted in John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-
lncrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1047, 1085 n.157 (1994). 
87. AUGUSTIN S. CLAYTON, THE OFFICE AND DUIT OF A JUSTICE OF THE 
PEACE (Milledgeville, S. Grantland 1819), quoted in Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: 
Reconsidering the Constitutional Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1128 (1994). 
88. See 1 THOMAS STARKIE, PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVI-
DENCE 51-52 (Theron Metcalf ed., Boston, Wells & Lilly 1826). 
89. Thomas Cartwright, Treatise on the Oath Ex Officio, in CARTWRIGHTIANA 
33 (Albert Peel & Leland H. Carlson eds., 1951), quoted in LEVY, supra note 52, at 
177. 
90. John Lilburne, The Just Defence of John Lilburn, in THE LEVELLER TRACTS 
1647-1653, at 450, 454 (Willjam Haller & Godfrey Davies eds., 1944) (containing 
Lilburne's description of his Star Chamber prosecution, written at the time of his 1653 
treason trial). 
91. WILLIAM BRADFORD, OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION, 1620-1647, at 407 (Sa-
muel E. Morison ed., 1952). 
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v1vmg responses exhibited little shyness about asking incriminating 
questions of unswom suspects or about pressing these suspects through 
"force of argument." It declared, however, that physical force, threats 
of increased punishment, and interrogation under oath were all 
impermissible: 
l conceive that a magistrate is bound, by careful examination of circum-
stances and weighing of probabilities, to sift the accused; and by force of 
argument to draw him to an acknowledgment of the truth. But he may 
not extract a confession of a capital crime from a suspected person by 
any violent means, whether it be by an oath imposed, or by any punish-
ment inflicted or threatened to be inflicted, for so he may draw forth an 
acknowledgment of a crime from a fearful innocent. If guilty, he shall be 
compelled to be his own accuser, when no other can, which is against the 
rule of justice.92 
Summarizing the responses that the governor received, John 
Winthrop saw two principles at work: first, a principle that one might 
call "the Greenawalt principle," affording suspects 1:1 right to silence in 
cases of light suspicion but not when a strong evidentiary basis for in-
terrogation existed; and second, an unqualified prohibition of torture 
and of requiring suspects to answer under oath: 
[When a crime has been committed] and one witness or strong presump-
tions do point out the offender, there the judge may examine him strictly, 
and he is bound to answer directly, though to the peril of his life. But if 
there be only light suspicion, &c. then the judge is not to press him to 
answer ... but he may be silent, and call for his accusers. But for exami-
nation by oath or torture in criminal cases, it was generally denied to be 
lawful.93 
92. Id. (response of Ralph Partrich). A second response condemned the oath ex of-
ficio and the infliction of punishment for failure to confess but emphasized that "[a] 
magistrate cannot without sin neglect diligent inquisition into the cause brought before 
him." This response added, "[I]f it be manifest that a capital crime is committed, and 
that common report or probability, suspicion or some complaint (or the like), be of this 
or that person, a magistrate ought to require, and by all due means to procure from the 
person . . . a naked confession of the fact." The failure of a magistrate to fulfill this 
duty would "betray his country and people to the heavy displeasure of God." Id. at 
405-06 (response of John Rayner). 
The third response condemned "extract[ing] a confession from a delinquent by an 
oath in matters of life or death." Nevertheless, so long as the "presumptions are 
strong" and the matters are "of highest consequence, such as do concern the safety or 
ruin of states or countries, magistrates may proceed so far to bodily torments, as racks, 
hot irons, etc. to extract a confession." Id. at 412-13 (response of Charles Chauncy). 
For Charles Chauncy, later the.President of Harvard College, see id. at 314 n.4, placing 
a suspect on oath apparently was more offensive than torture. Although torture was to 
be used only sparingly in capital cases, interrogation under oath was impermissible. 
93. 2 JOHN WINTHROP, HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND 47 (J. Savage ed., 2d ed., 
Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1826). In 1637 the General Court of Massachusetts sum-
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In 1677 the Virginia House of Burgesses declared that forcing suspects 
to answer incriminating questions under oath was incompatible with 
their natural rights. In the aftermath of Bacon's Rebellion and its sup-
pression, the House resolved "that a person summoned as a witnes 
against another, ought to answer upon oath, but noe law can compell a 
man to sweare against himselfe in any matter wherein he is lyable to 
corporall punishment. "94 
These sources and others discussed below support this judgment: 
The Fifth Amendment privilege prohibited (1) incrimipating interroga-
tion under oath, (2) torture,95 and (3) probably other forms of coercive 
interrogation such as threats of future punishment and promises of leni-
ency.96 The Amendment prohibited nothing more, or at least the sources 
moned John Wheelwright to account for his unorthodox religious views. The General 
Court assured him, however, that he would not be examineq "by any compulsory 
means, as by oath, imprisonment, or the like." LEVY, supra note 52, at 342. 
94. 2 STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIR-
GINIA 422 (William W. Hening ed., Richmond, The Franklin Press 1820). 
95. Although John Langbein maintains doubtfully that England's prohibition of 
torture was effected "before the first traces of the privilege at common law," Langbein, 
supra note 86, at 1085, Americans of the founding generation unmistakably sa'Y{ th~ 
privilege as a safeguard against torture. See LEVY, supra note 52, at 430; Amar & 
Lettow, supra note 32, at 865 n.20. In addition to the sources cited by these works, see 
1 LEONARD MA.cNALLY, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN 275 
(Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1804) (declaring that one purpose of the privilege is to outlaw 
torture). English sources similarly described the privilege as forbidding torture. See Sol-
lom Emlyn, Preface to 1 COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALs AND PROCEED-
INGS FOR HIGH TREASON iv·(2d ed., London, J. Walthoe 1730) ("In other Countries, 
Racks and Instruments of Torture are applied to force from the Prisoner a Confession, 
sometimes of more than is true; but this is a Practice which Englishmen are happily un-
acquainted with, enjoying the benefit of that just and reasonable Maxim, Nemo tenetur 
accusare seipsum .... ") (footnote omitted); 1 JAMES FITZ.JAMES STEPHEN, A HIS-
TORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 440 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1883) 
("[T]he assertion that the maxim, 'Nemo tenetur accusare seipsum,' was part of the law 
of God and of nature ... was all the more popular because it condemned the practice of 
torture for purposes of evidence, then in full use both on the Continent and in Scot-
land."). Herman, supra note 83, collects and discusses these sources at 178-79. 
96. Under the common law of evidence, such threats and promises rendered out-
of-court confessions involuntary. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its His-
tory, 19 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 12 (1979). Wigmore insisted that the law of voluntariness 
developed independently of the principle nemo tenetur seipsum prodere. See 8 WIG-
MORE, supra note 4, § 2266. He assailed the Supreme Court for declaring in Bram v. 
United States: 
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises 
whether a confession is inco_mpetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled 
by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself." 
168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 823, at 337 n.2. 
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mention nothing more.97 The Self-Incrimination Clause neither man-
dated an accusatorial system nor afforded defendants a right to remain 
silent. It focused upon improper methods of gaining information from 
criminal suspects. 
If this understanding of the original understanding is correct, critics 
of the Fifth Amendment privilege have missed the mark. Although the 
intensity of the framers' disapproval of sworn statements by suspects 
may seem foreign to us today, the policies that informed the privilege 
were coherent and compelling, and they were· not in t~nsion with ordi-
nary morality. When Ann has a strong basis for suspecting that Betty 
has stolen her property, ordinary morality may permit Ann to interro-
gate Betty and to draw an adverse inference if she refuses to respond. 
Ordinary morality, however, does not permit Ann to place Betty on the 
rack or to insist that Betty swear upon threat of imprisonment for false-
hood or silence that her explanation is true. When critics have spoken 
harshly of the privilege against self-incrimination, they have assumed 
that it afforded more than a right to be free of inhuman methods of in-
Recently, however, Lawrence Herman noted several occasions in the seventeenth, 
eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries when treatise writers, courts, counsel, and a 
member of the House of Lords described the requirement that guilty pleas and other 
confessions be voluntary as one incident of the nemo tenetur principle. See Herman, 
supra note 83, at 143-47, 152-53, 168-69. Herman advanced other reasons for doubting 
Wigmore's claim that the privilege and the requirement of voluntariness were entirely 
independent of one another, including the fact that both doctrines were described as for-
bidding torture. See id. at 177-80. Charles McCormick once remarked that although the 
two doctrines had arisen at different times, the kinship between them was "too apparent 
for denial." Charles T. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 
TuxAs L. REV. 447, 453 (1938). 
Even if, as Wigmore claimed, "the privilege" antedated the requirement of volun-
tariness by 100 years, the requirement that confessions be voluntary antedated the Fifth 
Amendment. See, e.g., R. v. Rudd, 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 161 (K.B. 1775). The Framers of 
the Fifth Amendment might well have assumed that their prohibition of "compulsion" 
to incriminate oneself included a requirement that confessions be "uncompelled" or 
voluntary. There is little reason to suppose that the unqualified language of the Fifth 
Amendment and of other American formulations of the privilege merely reiterated the 
traditional English understanding of the nemo tenetur principle (whether the Americans 
knew that they were innovating or not). Wigmore's view notwithstanding, the reading of 
the Fifth Amendment offered by Bram v. United States seems at least plausible both 
textually and historically. 
97. In seeking the target of an unqualified privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, moreover, inhuman methods of interrogation seem a more promising can-
didate than the ability to ask questions and expect answers from people accused of 
crime. Henry Hart and Albert Sacks once wrote that in seeking the meaning of an am-
biguous or unclear legislative c;:nactrnent, one should "assume, unless the contrary un-
mistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing 
reasonable purposes reasonably." HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE 
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 
1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
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terrogation. They have assumed that it afforded a right to silence - a 
right not to respond to incriminating questions at an. The evidence, 
however, is overwhelming that the privilege did not afford this right at 
the time that it appeared in the Bill of Rights. 
What the Fifth Amendment privilege did not prohibit is in fact 
clearer than what it did. The privilege did not prohibit the forceful in-
criminating interrogation of suspects by judges and magistrates so long 
as the suspects remained unswom. Unswom suspects who refused to re-
spond to the questions of English and American courts .doubtless would 
have suffered no more severe sanction than the drawing of an adverse 
inference.98 The procedures of the prenineteenth-century trial, however, 
would have made that disadvantage substantial in every case and devas-
tating in most. The privilege did not afford suspects a right to suffer no 
consequences for their refusal to speak.99 
98. One cannot know much, however, about what common law judges would have 
done if unsworn defendants had refused to answer, for during the centuries prior to the 
Bill of Rights, almost none did. One who did - the first, apparently - was John 
Udall. When Udall was tried for seditious libel in 1590, the court invited the jury to 
consider his silence as evidence of his guilt. He was convicted and sentenced to death, 
and he died in prison. See LEVY, supra note 52, at 168-70; Herman, supra note 83, at 
120-21. 
The most prominent of the common-law defendants to assert a right to silence was 
John Lilbume, the most famous of the Levellers. Lilbume earlier had objected to ex of-
ficio proceedings in the Court of Star Chamber, although he had declined to answer 
only questions concerning unspecified charges. During his common law trial for treason 
in 1649, he claimed many nonexistent rights. When Lilburne refused to say at his trial 
whether he had written a particular document, the attorney general quarreled with him. 
Other proof of Lilburne's authorship was at hand, however, and the court imposed no 
formal sanction for his refusal. Trial of John Lilbume, 4 How. St. Tr. 1269, 1340-41 
(1649). 
At his arraignment, Lilbume declared, "[B]y the Laws of England, I am not to an-
swer questions against or concerning myself," and the presiding judge replied, "You 
shall not be compelled." 4 How. St. Tr. at 1292-93. This response should not be read as 
an expression of the court's approval of Lilbume's claim or as a promise that no infer-
ence would be drawn from his failure to respond. The statement might simply have rec-
ognized that English law authorized no formal, judicially imposed punishment when a 
person who had not been summoned or sworn as a witness declined to speak. Lilbume 
was subject to the same informal pressure to speak as other defendants, and he did not 
remain at all silent at his trial. 
With very few exceptions, only suspects brought before the prerogative courts and 
other sworn witnesses ever invoked the maxim nemo tenetur seipsum prodere. As 
Lawrence Herman suggests, a common law defendant who remained silent during a 
pretrial examination would have been denied bail, and silence before or during trial 
would have been called to the attention of the trier of fact. See Herman, supra note 83, 
at 124 (citing JOHN H. LANG~EIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 11 
(1974)). 
99. The imposition of formal sanctions for silence might have been regarded as 
"torture" forbidden by the privilege, but there is a difference between withholding pun-
ishment for conduct and approval of that conduct. Although a suspect might have a 
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John Langbein has distinguished between two historic models of 
the criminal trial: the "accused speaks" trial and the "testing the prose-
cution" trial.100 He argues that the transformation of the "accused 
speaks" trial into the "testing the prosecution" trial began in the late 
eighteenth century when lawyers came to represent defendants in signif-
icant numbers. So long as defendants were unrepresented, no one could 
speak for them unless they spoke for themselves. In this situation, a 
right to remain silent would have been a right to commit suicide. 
Langbein notes that several other aspects of common law procedure 
also induced defendants to speak, 101 and the evidence is clear that in the 
sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries virtually all English de-
fendants did speak.102 One source described the criminal trial as an "al-
tercation" between the defendant and his accusers.103 
Trial, moreover, was not the only stage of the criminal process at 
which the accused was expected to speak. The Marian Committal 
Statute of 1555 required justices of the peace to interrogate suspects 
following their apprehension and to record anything ~•materiall to prove 
the felonie." 104 Until the mid-eighteenth century, the record of the 
defendant's pretrial examination was read routinely at her trial.105 Courts 
then began to express a preference for hearing the defendant's account 
from the defendant herself, but the record of her pretrial examination 
remained available for impeachment purposes. If the defendant said 
something different at trial from what she had told the magistrate, the 
jury heard about it.106 
Eben Moglen has reported that American criminal procedure 
throughout the colonial period and into the early republic corresponded 
right not to be imprisoned for refusing to answer, his refusal to answer might neverthe-
less be considered wrongful. 
100. Langbein, supra note 86, at 1048. 
101. See id. at 1055-66. 
102. See J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660-1800, at 
348-49 (1986) ("There was no thought that the prisoner had a right to remain silent on 
the grounds that he would otherwise be liable to incriminate himself .... [T]he assump-
tion was clear that if the case against him was false the prisoner ought to say so and 
suggest why, and that if he did not speak that could only be because he was unable to 
deny the truth of the evidence."). · 
103. See Langbein, supra note 86, at 1049 (quoting THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUB-
LICA ANGLORUM, bk. 2, ch. 23, at 114 (Mary Dewar ed., Cambridge University Press 
1982) (1583, written circa 1565)). 
104. 2 & 3 Phil. & M., ell. 10 (Eng.). 
· 105. The defendant's statement often was read by the justice of the peace himself; 
this judicial officer frequently appeared as a witness against the defendant. See 
Langbein, supra note 86, at 1059-61. 
106. See id. at 1060 n.58. 
/ 
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to the "accused speaks" model.107 Moglen offers little direct evidence 
concerning the defendant's role at trial (little evidence seems to sur-
vive), but he does demonstrate that the Marian procedure was firmly in 
place. Justices of the Peace throughout America interrogated unsworn 
defendants, and these defendants' statements were used at trial.108 
In England, lawyers were first permitted to represent criminal de-
fendants in ordinary felony trials in the 1730s, and according to 
Langbein, "[t]he use of defense counsel remained a relative trickle for 
another half century, until the 1780s."109 Within another half century, 
however, counsel had begun to work a substantial change in English 
criminal procedure. As early as 1820, the French visitor Charles Cottu 
wrote of the English trial: "[T]he defendant acts no kind of part: his hat 
stuck on a pole might without inconvenience be his substitute." 11° Cottu 
may have exaggerated, however, for "accused speaks" procedures ap-
parently persisted into the 1820s and even the 1830s.111 Criminal de-
fendants had no right to remain silent until well into the nineteenth 
century. · 
Langbein argues that "the purpose of the [early] rule denying de-
fense counsel was ... diametrically opposed to the purpose of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination,"112 that "[t]he privilege against self-
incrimination is the creature of defense counsel," 113 and that "the real 
origins of the privilege against self-incrimination" are to be found in 
the decades in which "defense counsel broke up the 'accused speaks' 
trial." 114 These statements are accurate if, when Langbein refers to "the 
privilege against self-incrimination," he means "the right to remain si-
lent" (as he seems to) .. The statements are not accurate, however, if 
Langbein means the privilege against self-incrimination that the Fram-
ers included in the Bill of Rights. This privilege was not the product of 
107. Moglen, supra note 87, at 1089. 
108. Id. at 1094-99; see also JULIUS GOEBEL. JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON. 
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YoRK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE 652-59 (1944) (demonstrating the use at trial of confessions before magistrates 
and inferring that defendants in colonial New York were "directly vulnerable to que$-
tioning from the bench"). 
109. See Langbein, supra note 86, at 1068. A statute in 1696 had permitted de-
fense counsel to appear in treason trials_. 
110. CHARLES Corru. ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
ENGLAND 73 (1822) (translation of DE L'ADMINISTRATION DE LA JUSTICE 
CRIMINELLE EN ANGLETERRE (1820)). 
111. See Henry Smith, The Modern Privilege: Its Nineteenth Century Origins, in 
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
(R.H. Helmholz ed., forthcoming 1997) (manuscript on file with the author). 
112. Langbein, supra note 86, at 1054. 
113. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
114. Id. at 1069. 
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lawyer-dominated trials or of the disappearance of "accused speaks" 
procedures.115 
Congress submitted the Bill of Rights to the states in 1789, at the 
end of the decade in which, Langbein reports, defense attorneys first 
appeared in English criminal trials in significant numbers. In J.M. 
Beattie's estimate, lawyers represented nearly twenty percent of the de-
fendants tried in the Old Bailey a few years before Congress's submis-
sion of the Fifth Amendment to the states, 116 and representation by 
counsel was rarer in America than in England.117 Moi;eover, the Fifth 
Amendment's formulation of the privilege was not new; similar declara-
.tions had appeared in a number of state constitutions.118 Indeed, in 
1776, just prior to American independence, the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights had listed among the defendant's privileges, "[n]or can he be 
compelled to give evidence against himself." 119 At this time, even in 
London, only about two percent of all felony defendants were repre-
sented by counsel, 120 and only about 180 residents of the American col-
onies were lawyers in the sense that they had been trained at the Inns of 
Court.121 The privilege against self-incrimination articulated by the Bill 
of Rights and by American state constitutions could not have been 
driven by lawyer-dominated trials. 
Noting that "accused speaks" procedures existed side-by-side with 
constitutional declarations of the privilege against self-incrimination, 
Eben Moglen maintains that "Americans did not feel themselves imme-
diately compelled to put their principles into practice." 122 The odds, 
115. At the conclusion of his essay, Langbein acknowledges that in denying the 
existence of the privilege against self-incrimination until the emergence of the Iawyer-
dominated trial, he has spoken in "a shorthand of sorts." Id. at 1084. 
116. See J.M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Crimi-
nal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 221, 227 
(1991). 
117. See, e.g., GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 108, at 573 (revealing that 
"counsel was only occasionally employed in criminal cases" in eighteenth century New 
York); PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 86 
(1992) ("[B]y the 1760s, counsel was permitted felony suspects in more than half the 
colonies.") (emphasis added); LEVY, supra note 52, at 369; John M. Murrin, The Legal 
Transformation: The Bench and Bar of Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, in COLO-
NIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS IN POLITICS. AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 540 (Stanley N. 
Katz & John M. Murrin eds., 1983). 
118. See Moglen, supra note 87, at 1118-21. 
119. 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, 
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 3813 
(Scholarly Press 1977) (1909), quoted in Moglen, supra note 87, at 1118. 
120. Beattie, supra note 116, at 227 (tbl. 1). 
121. LEVY, supra note 52, at 369. 
122. Moglen, supra note 87, at 1111-12. 
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however, seem against this hypothesis. Legal systems sometimes are 
false to their ideals - as this article has contended that ours is when it 
combines lofty accusatorial rhetoric with tawdry interrogation and plea 
bargaining practices.123 Nevertheless, people usually attempt to rational-
ize their practices in terms of their ideals. That the Framers of the Con-
stitution articulated constitutional principles without advertence to the 
fact that these principles were flatly inconsistent with their everyday 
practices seems unlikely. A more promising hypothesis is that the Fram-
ers saw no tension between their courtroom procedures and the princi-
ples that they declared in the Constitution. 
If someone had argued to judges of the founding generation that 
their "accused speaks" procedures violated the privilege against self-
incrimination, they might have offered any or all of three responses. 
These responses would have denied each and every element of a viola-
tion of the privilege: 
First, far from compelling any defendant to be a witness against himself, 
we do not permit any defendant to be a witness against (or for) himself. 
The defendant is disqualified from giving evidence partly because we are 
concerned that placing him on oath would be incompatible with his 
privilege.124 
Second, if our procedures compel defendants to do anything, it is not to 
incriminate themselves. We do not press defendants to admit their guilt. 
To the contrary, we want to hear anything that they may be able to say in 
their defense. When an occasional defendant attempts to plead guilty, we 
in fact discourage him.125 If there is any tilt to our procedures, we press 
defendants to exculpate rather than to incriminate themselves. 
Third, our procedures do not in fact compel anyone to do anything. If a 
defendant were to refuse to respond to judicial questions or to the 
charges against him, we would impose no punishment for his refusal. We 
would merely permit the jury to draw whatever inference seemed appro-
priate in determining whether he was guilty of the offense with which he 
123. See supra text accompanying notes 36-47. 
124. Perhaps judges of the early American republic would not have pressed this 
response too hard. True, the resolution of the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1677 de-
clared that "noe law can compell a man to sweare against himselfe in any matter 
wherein he is lyable to corporal! punishment"; the Virginia Declaration of Rights pro-
claimed a century later, "[N]or can he be compelled to give evidence against himself"; 
and the federal Bill of Rights provided, "No person shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself." One doubts, however, that the authors of these 
provisions would have limited the privilege to sworn statements if the statements of an 
unsworn defendant who had been tortured were offered at his trial. 
125. See Alschuler, supra note 96, at 7-13; see also BEATTIE. supra note 102, at 
336-37, 446-47. 
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was charged. Pennitting a jury to draw a fair inference is a far cry from 
torture, placing a defendant upon oath, or any other form of compulsion. 
None of these judicial responses would have been plausible if defend-
ants had been examined under oath. Then the defendant would have 
been a witness; he would have been subject to compulsion (the punish-
ment for perjury) if he failed to speak the truth; and if the truth were in-
criminating, his oath would have pressed him to incriminate himself. 
Some early sources emphasized that placing a suspect under oath 
tempted him to commit perjury. The principal· concern . of these sources 
was to prevent what modem lawyers would call entrapment - that offi-
cials might prompt a suspect to commit a crime that he would have 
avoided in the absence of the officials' enticing conduct. The new 
crime, moreover, would be perjury, an offense that would not only sub-
ject the suspect to temporal punishment but also jeopardize his soul. 
Other sources referred to the oath as compulsion, a form of "vio-
lence" akin to torture. Their concern appeared to be, not that the sus-
pect would be induced to commit perjury, but rather that he would be 
compelled by improper methods to confess his crime. Concerns about 
tempting suspects to commit perjury may in fact have blended with 
concerns about compelling them to incriminate themselves; the choice 
among perjury, contempt, and self-incrimination was indeed a "cruel 
trilemma." 126 
Whatever their reasons, the manuals for justices of the peace in 
England and America consistently emphasized that the suspect was not 
to be sworn when examined.127 In two eighteenth-century English cases, 
justices of the peace overlooked the manuals' admonitions and adminis-
tered oaths to suspects before examining them. In both cases, judges ex-
cluded the suspects' statements from evidence at trial. In one case, the 
judge remarked, "If [the examination] is upon Oath it cannot be read, 
for Persons are not to swear against themselves; all Examinations ought 
to be taken freely and voluntarily, and not upon Oath, and then we can 
read them." 128 A pamphlet report of the second case explained: 
126. See 1 SIMON GREENLEAF. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 225, 
at 262-63 (Boston, Charles C. Little & °James Brown 1842) (explaining why a pretrial 
statement made under oath cannot be considered voluntary and linking the testimonial 
disqualification of defendants both to the nemo tenetur principle and to the concern that 
defendants should not be tempted to commit perjury). 
127. See, e.g., A NEW CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 158 (Albany, D. & s. Whiting 
1803); see also Moglen, supra note 87, at 1098. 
128. 4 Selected Trials at the Sessions - House in the Old - Bailey 26-27 (photo. re-
print 1985) (1742) (trial of Sarah Malcolm, O.B.S.P. (Feb. 4, 1733)); see also Langbein, 
supra note 86, at 1079 n. 142 (describing the trial). 
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[T]he confession was produced; but it being taken on oath, it could not 
be read. If it had been taken voluntarily it would have been admitted as 
good evidence; but the law supposes that an oath is compulsion; and con-
sequently that no man is obliged to swear against himself in cases where 
it affects his life.129 
The courts' unwillingness to receive sworn, self-incriminating testi-
mony explains what otherwise would seem a paradox: that witnesses for 
the prosecution and witnesses in civil cases were much more likely to 
invoke the privilege - and to do so successfully - than criminal de-
fendants.130 Unlike defendants, prosecution witnesses and witnesses in 
civil cases were sworn, and when they invoked the privilege, the courts 
forbade other trial participants from asking them incriminating ques-
tions. At least by 1700, both sworn defendants in religious courts and 
sworn witnesses in common law courts were permitted to decline to an-
swer any questions that could lead to criminal punishment or forfei-
ture.131 Once a witness was sworn, he was subject to compulsion, and 
his only protection lay in the ability to decline to answer specific ques-
tions. The protection of common law defendants, by contrast, lay in not 
being sworn at all. 
Eben Moglen offers persuasive evidence that American courts did 
not view the answers of unsworn defendants in the same light as those 
of sworn witnesses.132 Following ratification of the Fifth Amendment, 
some American lawyers began to object on nonconstitutional grounds to 
the pretrial interrogation of defendants by justices of the peace. These 
lawyers noted that, although American law generally incorporated the 
common law of England, it did not, in the absence of legislative provi-
sion to the contrary, incorporate English statutory law. Because the pre-
trial examination of defendants was authorized by a statute, the Marian 
Committal Statute of 1555, the lawyers contended that American law 
did not allow this procedure. 
Neither the lawyers nor the commentators who advanced this argu-
ment supplemented it with a claim that the pretrial examination of sus-
pects violated either the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination or the similar provisions of state constitutions. If anyone 
had thought that the Constitution guaranteed a right to remain silent or 
129. BEATIIE. supra note 102, at 365 n.129 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
This case is also described in Langbein, supra note 86, at 1079 n.142. 
130. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 86, at 1078-80. 
131. See 8 WIGMORE. supra note 4, § 2250, at 284, 289-90. In the trial of Sir 
John Freind, 13 How. St. Tr. 1, 17 (1696), Lord Chief Justice Treby said of a witness, 
"no man is bound to answer any questions that will subject him to a penalty or to 
infamy." 
132. See Moglen, supra note 87, at 1126-27. 
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that "accused speaks" procedures were inconsistent with the privilege, 
this would have been the occasion to say so. During three decades of 
debate over whether the Marian Committal Statute was a Parliamentary 
innovation or merely declarative of the common law, however, no one 
did. Even the opponents of "accused speaks" procedures did not con-
sider them inconsistent with the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. 
C. You Have a Right to Remain Silen~ 
The transformation of the privilege into a right of criminal defend-
ants to remain silent occurred only during the nineteenth century. Lawy-
erization of the trial contributed to a changed ideology of criminal pro-
cedure - one in which the dignity of defendants lay not in their ability 
to tell their stories fully, but rather in their ability to remain passive, to 
proclaim to the prosecutor "Thou sayest," and to force the state to 
shoulder the entire load. As defendants participated less in the proceed-
ings that determined their fate, they were seen more as objects or as 
targets of the coercive forces of the state. 
In Parliamentary debates of the 1820s and 1830s, reformers com-
plained that "accused speaks" procedures often worked unfairly. Many 
defendants were not sufficiently educated and articulate to tell their sto-
ries coherently. The remedy that the reformers sought, however, was not 
the declaration of a right to remain silent; instead, they proposed giving 
defense attorneys the power to argue on the defendants' behalf before 
juries. The expansion of the role of counsel which they secured in 1836 
permitted defendants to take a still more passive role at trial and con-
tributed to the rapidly changing ideology of English procedure.133 
An 1838 opinion declared that "[a] prisoner is not to be entrapped 
into making any statement" and that a magistrate should advise this 
suspect before taking his statement "that what he thinks fit to say will 
be taken down, and may be used against him on his trial." 134 A clearer 
doctrinal recognition of the right to remain silent came ten years later in 
Sir John Jervis's Act. This Act provided that, before the pretrial exami-
nation, the accused should be cautioned that he need not answer and 
that if he did answer, his answers cou1abe used against him at trial.135 
In New York City, magistrates hegan routinely to caution defendants in 
133. See Smith, supra note 111, at 24-29. 
134. R. v. Arnold, 173 Eng. Rep. 645, 645-46 (K.B. 1838). 
135. See 11 & 12 Viet., ch. 42, § 18 (1848) (Eng.). 
August 1996] A Peculiar Privilege 2661 
1835, the number of defendants who declined to submit to pretrial inter-
rogation increased thereafter.136 
A more significant doctrinal development than the magistrates' 
cautioning of suspects was the abolition of the testimonial disqualifica-
tion of defendants. In 1864 Maine became the first American jurisdic-
tion to allow defendants to offer sworn testimony in criminal cases, 137 
and other states quickly followed. The British Parliament, a latecomer 
to the movement, enacted its competency statute in 1898.138 By the end 
of the nineteenth century, Georgia was the only Americ~ state to retain 
the common law disqualification. It did not permit defendants to offer 
sworn testimony until 1962.139 
The statutes that ended the testimonial disqualification of defend-
ants were controversial, and the controversy centered on constitutional 
issues.140 Proponents maintained that defendants should have the same 
right as other witnesses to testify under oath and that the common law 
disqualification substituted a presumption of perjury for the presump-
tion of innocence.141 Opponents contended, however, that the statutes 
threatened the privilege against self-incrimination.142 They argued that 
jurors would view the failure of a lawyer to call his client to the witness 
stand as a confession of the client's guilt and that the jurors would draw 
this inference regardless of whatever cautionary instructions they re-
ceived. In practice, defendants would be pressed to take the oath; they 
would be subject to precisely the compulsion that state and federal con-
stitutions condemned.143 Many defendants, moreover, would respond by 
committing perjury. Sir James Stephen wrote, "[I]t is not in human na-
ture to speak the truth under such pressure as would be brought to bear 
136. See Mike McConville & Chester Mirsky, The Rise of Guilty Pleas: New York, 
1800-1865, 22 J.L. & SOCY. 443, 452 (1995). 
137. See Act of Mar. 25, 1864, ch. 280, 1864 Me. Laws 214 (codified as amended 
at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1315 (West 1994)). 
138. The Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, 61 & 62 Viet., ch. 36 (Eng.). 
139. See GA. CODE ANN.§§ 24-9-20, 17-7-28 (Michie 1995). 
140. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 578-79 (1961); Joel N. Bodansky, 
The Abolition of the Party-Witness Disqualijic{ltjgn: An Historical Survey, 70 KY. L.J. 
91, 115 (1981-82). 
141. Perhaps the earliest and certfilnly one of the most earnest proponents of this 
position was Jeremy Bentham. See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL 
EVIDENCE 381-90, 393-97 (Garland repr. 1978) (1827). 
142. See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 578-80; Bodansky, supra note 140, at 115. 
143. See, e.g., Seth Ames, Testimony of Persons Accused of Crime, 1 AM. L. REv. 
443, 444 (1867) ("In its actual workings, it will be found that this new statute will in-
evitably compel the defendant to testify, and will have substantially the same effect as if 
it did not go through the mockery of saying that he might testify if he pleased."). I am 
grateful to George Fisher for this reference. 
2662 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:2625 
on the prisoner, and it is not a light thing to institute a system which 
would almost enforce perjury on every occasion." 144 
In deference to constitutional concerns, most competency statutes, 
including the federal statute of 1878, 145 provided that the prosecutor 
could not comment on the failure of a defendant to testify and that no 
presumption against the defendant would arise from his failure to take 
the stand.146 Some courts later suggested that the statutes would have 
been invalid without these provisions.147 Placing defendants under oath 
144. JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
OF ENGLAND 202 (London and Cambridge, MacMillan & Co. 1863); see Ames, supra 
note 143, at 448 ("The guilty ... will add the crime of perjury to the crime set forth in 
the indictment. Even of the innocent, some, under the influence of terror and anxiety, 
may mix some falsehood with the truth, and so increase the embarrassment and aggra-
vate the damages of their position."). 
145. Act of Mar. 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1994)). 
146. See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 580; Bodansky, supra note 140, at 126. 
147. See Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y. 213, 222 (1871); Stapl~s v. State, 14 S.W. 603 
(Tenn. 1890); Price v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 393, 395 (1883) (indicating that without 
the no-comment provision, the competency statute would have been incompatible with 
the presumption of innocence); State v. Taylor, 50 S.E. 247, 249-50 (W. Va. 1905); 
Bodansky, supra note 140, at 126. 
The first competency statute, which was enacted in Maine, did not include a provi-
sion forbidding adverse comment on a defendant's failure to testify. The Maine Su-
preme Court not only upheld the constitutionality of this statute but also held that the 
privilege against self-incrimination did not preclude juries from considering a defend-
ant's failure to testify as evidence of his guilt. See State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200 (1867). 
The court noted that "[f]rom time immemorial the ... silence of the accused person, 
when charged, has been regarded as legitimate evidence" and that "refusals to account 
for the possession of stolen property, are evidences of guilt admitted." 55 Me. at 217. 
Ignoring an important limitation that a treatise writer included in his description of the 
circumstances in which an inference from silence was appropriate, the court quoted this 
description in support of its ruling: " 'Where a man at full liberty to speak and not in 
the course of a judicial inquiry is charged with a crime, and remains silent, that is, 
makes no denial of the accusation by word or gesture, his silence is a circumstance 
which may be left to the jury.' .. 55 Me. at 218 (citing WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW 
320) (emphasis added). 
The court did not advert to the distinction between drawing an adverse inference 
from the silence of an unswom person, which the privilege against self-incrimination 
never had precluded, and pressing a person to answer incriminating questions under 
oath, which it had. See also State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298, 301 (1871) (Appleton, CJ.) 
("Extra judicial non-responsion, when a charge .is_Jllade, is always regarded as an article 
of circumstantial evidence .... Is [the defendant's] silence of any less probative force, 
when thus in court called upon to contradict or explain ... ?"). In 1879, the Maine leg-
islature, "looking for a more careful protection" of the privilege against self-
incrimination than the state's supreme court had provided, see State v. Banks, 78 Me. 
490, 492 (1886), declared that a defendant's failure to testify should not be treated as 
evidence of his guilt. See Me. Stat. 1879, ch. 92, § 6. The Maine court later declared, 
"We think the intent of the statute is that the jury, in determining their verdict, shall en-
tirely exclude from their consideration the fact that the defendant did not elect to testify, 
substantially as if the law did not allow him to be a witness.'' Banks, 78 Me. at 492. I 
am grateful to George Fisher for leading me to the Maine sources. 
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apparently was constitutional only because defendants were thought to 
have an unfettered option to decline to take the witness stand without 
suffering any consequence. 
Some competency statutes expressly preserved the defendant's 
power to make an unsworn statement to the jury. Following the English 
Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, for example, defendants were allowed 
either to testify from the witness stand or to make an unsworn statement 
from the prisoner's dock. The sense that unsworn statements were 
worthless, however, led Parliament to abolish the option of speaking 
from the dock in 1982.148 Most American jurisdictions had reached the 
same conclusion long before. Today, Massachusetts may still allow de-
fendants to decide whether to offer sworn or unsworn statements, 149 but 
no other state gives defendants this option. 
Following the enactment of competency statutes, the law in some 
jurisdictions technically might have been that, although jurors could 
draw no lawful inference from a defendant's failure to testify under 
oath, they could lawfully consider the defendant's failure to make an 
unsworn statement.150 This distinction, however, was too thin to be 
maintained. When defendants, in practice, spoke only from the witness 
stand and when jurors were forbidden to draw an inference from their 
failure to take the stand, defendants had a right to remain silent at trial. 
In 1965 Griffin v. California held that prosecutorial or judicial 
comment on a defendant's failure to testify violated the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege. 151 The Framers of the Fifth Amendment, who might not 
have approved of sworn testimony by defendants at all, probably would 
have agreed that a defendant's refusal to submit to the compulsion of an 
oath could not be the subject of adverse comment. Griffin, however, 
forbade comment not simply on the refusal of a defendant to submit to 
an oath, but "on the accused's silence. " 152 The Court offered no indica-
tion that refusal to submit to an oath might differ from any other form 
of silence, and one year after Griffin, the Court extended the right to re-
main silent to unsworn suspects in custody in Miranda v. Arizona. That 
the presence or absence of an oath might have made a difference 
seemed inconceivable in 1966. Because an unsworn statement made in 
148. See Criminal Justice Act, 1982, ch. 48, § 72 (Eng.). 
149. It has been seventy years, however, since the Supreme Judicial Court's last 
reiteration of the defendant's ability to offer an unswom statement. See Commonwealth 
v. Stewart, 151 N.E. 74 (Mass. 1926). 
150. In other jurisdictions, the ability to make an unswom statement did not sur-
vive the enactment of competency statutes. See Bodansky, supra note 140, at 117 n.113. 
151. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
152. 380 U.S. at 615. 
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response to police interrogation would be used against a suspect at trial, 
it was the "functional equivalent" of testimony. The distinction be-
tween sworn and unswom statements, central to the framers' under-
standing of what it meant to be compelled to testify, had disappeared. 
In 1987 Rock v. Arkansas held that the Constitution guaranteed de-
fendants a right to testify under oath153 - a right the framers might 
have characterized as the right to be compelled. Turning the original un-
derstanding of the constitutional privilege on its head, the Supreme 
Court declared, "The opportunity to testify is ~ .. a ne<;:essary corollary 
to the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony." 154 
In the years since Miranda, Americans have seemed increasingly 
enamored of its accusatorial rhetoric, especially as they have learned 
that Miranda's system for protecting the Fifth Amendment privilege has 
little practical effect.155 During the Reagan administration, the Justice 
Department proposed abandoning Miranda, 156 but its proposal generated 
considerable criticism even among police administrators.157 
England, by contrast, has reassessed the value of "testing the pros-
ecution" trials. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 pro-
vides that, once an accused has been warned of the consequences of a 
failure to testify, "the court or jury ... may draw such inferences as 
appear proper from the failure of the accused to give evidence." 158 In 
153. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). 
154. 483 U.S. at 52. The Court's logic was no stronger than its history. Denying 
an opportunity to testify ensures that testimony will not be compelled. To say that a per-
son cannot be compelled to do what she is not permitted to do may be odd, but the 
Fifth Amendment plainly did forbid compelling defendants to be witnesses against 
themselves at a time when they were not permitted to be witnesses against themselves. 
The protections of the Fifth Amendment, however, were not limited to criminal defend-
ants. They extended to witnesses who could offer self-incriminating testimony if they 
chose. The Court in Rock may have overlooked this fact when it made the statement 
quoted in the text. 
155. Compare Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassess-
ment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387 (1996) and Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police In-
terrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. 
REv. 839 (1996) with Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect, supra note 6; George C. 
Thomas III, ls Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and Better) Empirical 
Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996); George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk About the 
Miranda Empirical Debate: A "Steady-State" Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REv. 
933 (1996). . 
156. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE 
ATIORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION (1986). 
157. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Fifth Amendment at Justice: A Reply, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 950, 954 (1987). 
158. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, § 35 (Eng.). The Criminal Pro-
cedure Act of Norway provides that a criminal defendant need not respond to the 
charges against him when the state's attorney reads these charges at the outset of his 
trial. Nevertheless, "[i]f the person charged refuses to answer, or states that he reserves 
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addition, the Act invites jurors and judges to draw inferences from the 
pretrial silence of defendants. 159 The Act encourages suspects to cooper-
ate with police investigations, to disclose defenses at the earliest oppor-
tunity, and to submit to cross-examination at trial, but its supporters 
contend that it is consistent with the privilege against self-incrimination 
because it does not treat a suspect's failure to speak as a crime or as 
contempt of court.160 
The European Court of Human Rights will decide whether the 
1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act violates England's obliga-
tion under the European Convention on Human Rights to give every 
defendant a fair trial. Past decisions make it doubtful that the Act will 
survive this scrutiny.161 After centuries of self-congratulation by English 
judges and lawyers who have denigrated the "inquisitorial" practices of 
the European continent, continental judges may take ironic pleasure in 
denouncing England's "inquisitorial" procedure. 
Eben Mo glen observes, "[T]he history of the privilege reveals how 
procedure makes substance, and how legal evolution~ like natural selec-
tion itself, adapts old structures to new functions." 162 More than the ad-
aptation of old doctrines to new functions, however, the history of the 
privilege against self-incrimination seems to reveal the tyranny of slo-
gans. Shorthand phrases have taken on lives of their own. 163 These 
phrases have eclipsed the goals of the doctrines that they purported to 
describe and even the texts that embodied these doctrines. The phrases 
and the images they evoked - what the phrases "sounded like" -
shaped the law. Latin maxims declaring that "no one shall be com-
pelled to betray himself:' have sounded like the declaration that "no 
his answer, the president of the court may inform him that this may be considered to 
tell against him." The Criminal Procedure Act of Norway, Ch. 9, § 93 (1991) (unoffi-
cial English translation), quoted in William T. Pizzi, Punishment and Procedure: A Dif-
ferent View of the American Criminal Justice System, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 55, 61 
(1996). 
159. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, §§ 34, 36, 37 (Eng.); see 
generally Ian Dennis, The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994: The Evidence 
Provisions, 1995 CRIM. L. REv. 4; Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right to 
Silence and Moves Towards an inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 402 (1994). 
160. See Dennis, supra note 159, at 10. 
161. See Funke v. Fr., App. No. 10828/84, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 297 (1993) (Court 
report). The 1994 Act was modeled in large part on the Criminal Evidence (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1988, and the European Commission of Human Rights has concluded 
that in many applications the Northern Ireland Order violates Article 6.1 of the Euro-
pean Convention. See Murray v. U.K., App. No. 18739/91, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. CDI 
(Commn. Supp. 1994) (Commission report). 
162. Moglen, supra note 87, at 1090. 
163. Some scholars call this process "reification." 
2666 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:2625 
one shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself." The latter declaration has been summarized as "the privilege 
against self-incrimination" (a description not generally in use before the 
twentieth century164 and one that omits all reference to the constitutional 
concept of compulsion). The "privilege against self-incrimination," in 
tum, has sounded like the "right to remain silent." Much of the history 
of the privilege has been a story of slippage from one doctrine to an-
other without awareness of the change. Officials appear to have drifted 
from limiting the burdens of the religious obligation to confess in the 
interest of obtaining more confessions to condemning incriminating in-
terrogation under oath without adequate evidentiary justification. They 
have drifted from condemning interrogation under oath without eviden~ 
tiary justification to condemning torture and all incriminating interroga-
tion of suspects under oath. The officials then have drifted to a judg-
ment that the framers of all of the earlier doctrines unques_tionably 
would have disapproved - that it is unfair to expect defendants on trial 
and people arrested on probable cause to participate actively in the 
criminal process by telling what they know. J6s 
Linguistic confusion also may have affected historians of the privi-
lege, and some of the apparent disagreement among them may have 
arisen from the ambiguity of phrases like "the privilege against self-
incrimination." When scholars like John H. Wigmore have concluded 
that the privilege was in place in common law courts by the end of the 
seventeenth century, they have meant, mostly, that sworn witnesses in 
these courts could decline to answer questions on the ground that their 
answers would incriminate them.166 When, however, scholars like John 
Langbein have maintained that the privilege did not come into effective 
existence until more than a century later, they have meant, mostly, that 
until the nineteenth century unsworn criminal defendants were expected 
to answer questions both before trial and at trial. 
It might be said that the historians have described two different 
privileges that arose centuries apart, each of them treated as "the" priv-
164. See LEVY, supra note 52, at.xvi ("The familiar phrase of contemporary us-
age seems to be of twentieth-century vintage."). 
165. Cf. Wigmore, supra note 32, at 71 ("If one instance better than another 
serves to exemplify the manner in which history may cover up the origin of a legal 
principle, destroy all traces of its real significance, change and recast its purpose and its 
use, while preserving an identify of form . . . it is this rule that no man shall be com-
pelled to criminate himself."). 
166. The number of cases recognizing this privilege of sworn witnesses may not 
have been large, but in the absence of any cases after 1700 rejecting the privilege, they 
are sufficiently numerous to justify the historians' conclusion. 
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ilege against self-incrimination.167 Sworn witnesses were privileged not 
to answer incriminating questions by the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury, and criminal defendants gained recognition of their right to remain 
silent approximately 150 years later. 
IV. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 
The history of the privilege against self-incrimination seems to 
pose its own "cruel trilemma" for American .courts. One possible op-
tion for modem courts is to return to the original understanding of the 
Fifth Amendment with its strong distinction between sworn and un-
swom statements. In our era, however, the fires of hell have smoldered. 
Oaths have lost their terror and even their meaning. Bruce Ackerman, 
moreover, has pointed to a number of "constitutional moments" that 
have effectively altered the Constitution without formal amendment.168 
The enactment of statutes ending the testimonial disqualification of de-
fendants was, if not a constitutional moment, at least a constitutional 
nanosecond. In a very different world from that of the early American 
republic, restoring the original understanding of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege is impossible. 
If the distinction between sworn and unswom statements cannot be 
maintained today, two options remain. One is to treat sworn statements 
in the same way that eighteenth century English and American courts 
treated unswom statements - by strongly encouraging them and by 
drawing adverse inferences when defendants fail to provide them. 
England, in effect, chose this option in the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act of 1994, which authorized judges and jurors to draw such ad-
verse inferences in many situations. The second option is to treat un-
swom statements in the same way that eighteenth century courts treated 
sworn statements - with wariness if not complete disapproval. At least 
on paper, the United States Supreme Court chose this option for defend-
ants in custody in Miranda v. Arizona. 
If the United States were now to follow England's lead, which 
seems extremely unlikely, it would treat sworn statements in the same 
manner that the framers of the Fifth Amendment treated unswom state-
167. The historians may have been misled by the assumption that criminal defend-
ants ought to have been the principal beneficiaries of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the principal benefit that defendants de-
rived from the privilege was that they were not expected or permitted to give sworn tes-
timony; accordingly, they could not be punished formally for false answers or for re-
maining silent. Modern historians have had difficulty seeing the lack of an oath as a 
significant benefit. 
168. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
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ments. Just as the framers expected defendants to speak at trial, courts 
would now expect them to testify. Griffin v. California would be over-
ruled along with Miranda. The privilege would remain a safeguard 
against torture and other forms of coercive interrogation, although not 
against the coercion once thought inherent in the oath. As a concession 
to the past, courts might permit defendants to testify under oath but ex-
empt their testimony from the penalties for perjury, confirming the de 
facto exemption that prosecutors usually provide in practice.169 With the 
threat of secular penalties removed, the sworn statements of our era 
might be no more the product of compulsion than the unsworn state-
ments of the founders' era, and treating today's sworn statements like 
the unsworn statements of the past might be the most accurate "transla-
tion" of the Framers' understanding.170 This position might also be sup-
ported by reading the Fifth Amendment at the highest level of general-
ity, by declaring that the word "compelled" invites each generation to 
determine for itself what interrogation methods are offensive, and by 
proclaiming that, in the final years of the twentieth century, requiring 
someone to swear to tell the truth does not seem very much like tor-
ture.171 Still, one might be troubled by an interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment that, in one very clear sense, would afford less protection 
to defendants than the Framers intended them to have. 
The last alternative - treating unsworn statements by defendants 
in the same way that the Framers treated sworn statements - might bar 
sworn and unsworn statements from evidence altogether. At least it 
would require suspects to make unfettered waivers of the right to re-
main silent whenever they responded to official inquiry. It also would 
forbid fact finders from drawing adverse inferences from the failure of 
defendants to answer. This solution, the one that Miranda adopted for 
169. See VINCENT BUGLIOSI, OUI'RAGE: THE FIVE REASONS WHY O.J. SIMP· 
SON GOT AWAY WITH MURDER 173 (1996) ("[F)or the hundreds of thousands of de-
fendants convicted every year throughout the land for various crimes, it is almost un-
heard of for there to follow, after their conviction, a prosecution against them for 
perjury."). This informal exemption may stem Jess from sympathy for the defendant's 
self-preservation efforts than from the limited practical utility of a perjury prosecution 
following a criminal trial. When an app_arently perjurious defendant has been convicted 
at trial, the sentence imposed for her offense is likely to make additional punishment 
seem unnecessary. Indeed, the sentencing judge might have increased the defendant's 
sentence because she apparently lied on the stand. See United States v. Grayson, 438 
U.S. 41 (1978). When a defendant who may have testified falsely is acquitted, moreo-
ver, the likelihood of a successful perjury prosecution is ordinarily slim. 
170. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 1165 
(1993). 
171. Virtually all other readings of the Amendment could be supported in the 
same way. 
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suspects in police custody, is the worst alternative of all. It is likely to 
be honored more on paper than in practice, and if taken seriously, it 
would all but abandon defendants as an evidentiary resource. No sensi-
ble criminal justice system would pay this high price; no coherent ethi-
cal principle could explain why it should; and the architects of the 
Constitution never imagined that the Fifth Amendment would be read to 
demand it. 
The history of the privilege against self-incrimination provides 
only limited guidance in resolving the Fifth" Amendment issues that 
confront modern courts. Recognition that the Amendment does not af-
ford a right to remain silent or require an unfettered waiver of this right 
whenever officials ask incriminating questions could lead to a reconsid-
eration of Miranda, but history cannot tell judges what sorts of interro-
gation amount to compulsion under the Amendment. As Carol Steiker 
has observed, "Our twentieth-century police and even our contempo-
rary sense of 'policing' [would be] utterly foreign to our colonial fore-
bears." 172 Nothing closely resembling stationhouse interrogation oc-
curred at the time of the Fifth Amendment's framing. 
The nearest analogue to police interrogation known to the Framers 
was interrogation before a magistrate under the Marian Committal 
Statute of 1555, 173 and for decades, people whose names "read[] like an 
honor roll of the legal profession" - Wigmore, Pound, Kauper, 
Friendly, Schaefer, Frankel, and others - have proposed a return to 
something like the Marian procedure.174 Pretrial interrogation before a 
magistrate of the sort that they envision might require the magistrate to 
172. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HAR.v. L. 
REv. 820, 830 (1994); cf. Albert W. Alschuler, Fourth Amendment Remedies: The Cur-
rent Understanding, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT 
UNDERSTANDING 197 (Eugene W. Hickock, Jr. ed., 1991) ("Among the things that did 
not exist at the time the Fourth Amendment became part of the Constitution were co-
caine, heroin, helicopters, magnetometers, drug-detecting dogs, professional police 
forces, and the exclusionary rule."). 
173. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text. 
174. The quoted phrase comes from Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345 n.5 
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting), in which Justice Stevens commented in dissent that 
"the roster of scholars and judges with reservations about expanding the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege reads like an honor roll of the legal profession." See MARVIN E. 
FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 98-99 (1980); SCHAEFER, supra note 32, at 77-81; 
Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional 
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968); Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the 
Accused - A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REv. 1224 (1932); Roscoe 
Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1014 (1934); Wigmore, supra note 32, at 85-88; see also Dripps, 
supra note 32; Yale Kamisar, Kauper's "Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty 
Years Later- Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REv. 15 (1974). 
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find probable cause for a suspect's arrest before interrogation could be-
gin. It might permit the suspect to be represented by counsel when her 
statement is taken. It might bow to the original understanding of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege by allowing the suspect to remain unsworn. 
It might permit the magistrate or, perhaps, a prosecutor to question the 
suspect, taking her statement in much the same manner that a lawyer 
engaged in civil practice takes a deposition. This procedure might also 
afford the suspect a reciprocal opportunity to obtain the statements of 
prosecution witnesses. In 1980 Scotland reinstated its pretrial examina-
tion of defendants, and Scotland's experience might guide American 
reform.175 
A suspect's answers to orderly questioning in a safeguarded court-
room environment should not be regarded as the product of compulsion. 
These answers might tend to prove the suspect's guilt because they 
were incriminating, seemed internally contradictory, rang untrue in cer-
tain details, or were inconsistent with the suspect's defense at trial. 
Equally, the answers might tend to prove the suspect's innocence by 
showing that she had denied her guilt promptly, in a manner consistent 
with her trial defense, and in apparently forthcoming answers to spe-
cific questions. Interrogation before a judicial officer would be likely to 
promote accurate fact-finding both when accurate fact-finding would 
help the suspect and when it would hurt her. If the suspect refused to 
answer, her refusal should be admissible at trial both because it would 
have a rational bearing on her guilt and because its admission would 
175. See Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 1980, ch. 62, sec. 6(2); Neil Gow, The 
Revival of Examinations, 141 New L.J. 680 (1991) (offering a less sanguine appraisal of 
Scottish procedure than some Scottish judges and practitioners think justified). In 
Scotland the examination occurs before a sheriff, the judicial officer who presides at 
criminal trials in most serious cases. Most of the questioning is by a prosecutor. The ac-
cused is not sworn and usually is represented by counsel. He may confer with counsel 
before answering any question, and counsel may supplement the record by asking clari-
fying questions of the accused. Questions focus not only on the accuracy of the charges 
and the availability of defenses but also on the accuracy of any statements that the ac-
cused has given to the police and the circumstances in which the statements were made. 
The relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act caution that "ques-
tions should not be designed to challenge the truth of anything said by the accused," 
that "there should be no reiteration of a question which the accused has refused to an-
swer," that "there should be no leading questions," and that it is the sheriff's responsi-
bility to "ensure that all questions are fairly put to, and understood by, the accused." 
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 1980, ch. 62, sec. 6(2), § 20A(2)(a)-(c). Although the 
accused may decline to answer - and some do, typically citing the advice of counsel 
- the prosecutor and judge may comment at trial on the accused's failure to answer 
whenever the accused or any defense witness has testified about a matter that the ac-
cused might have explained at the examination. See Alexander v. H.M. Advocate, 1988 
Scottish Crim. Cas. Rep. 542, 1989 Scots L. Times 193. 
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express the judgment that, following a showing of probable cause, sus-
pects can reasonably be expected to respond to orderly inquiry. For the 
same reason, a defendant should be expected to speak at trial - per-
haps under oath but exempted from the penalties for perjury176 - and if 
she declined, the jury or judge should be permitted to draw appropriate 
inferences. 177 
176. Pennitting defendants to testify under oath but.exempting them from the pen-
alties for perjury would resemble the practice of the High Commission in the early sev-
enteenth century, but despite the infamy of the High Commission, the compromise 
might be appropriate. Jeremy Bentham once observed that courts need not avoid sitting 
in chambers decorated with stars merely because the court of Star Chamber met in such 
a chamber. 5 BENTHAM. supra note 141, at 241. 
The primary reason for retaining the oath despite the absence of a fonnal sanction 
for violating it would be to avoid a sharp, unexplained contrast in fonn between the tes-
timony of defendants and the testimony of other witnesses. Perhaps a defendant should 
be allowed to present her testimony with the same solemn promise of truthfulness as 
other witnesses even if she is not threatened with punishment fqr falsehood. 
Justice Walter Schaefer once said of a regime in which defendants were questioned 
at trial but not under oath, "These rules seem to me to follow natural assumptions. The 
silence of the accused is noted and taken into account because of the strength of the in-
ference of guilt that flows from his failure to respond; the refusal to administer an oath 
to the accused, or to force him to answer, reflects spiritual and physical aspects of the 
law of self-preservation invoked by John Lilburn before the Star Chamber." SCHAE-
FER, supra note 32, at 71. 
177. Amidst the disturbing "get tough on crime" laws of the late twentieth cen-
tury, Congress or a state legislature might actually enact a fair and useful "get tough" 
measure: 
Section 001. Testimony of the Defendant. 
(A) A defendant may testify under oath in the same manner as any other witness 
or may decline to testify. · 
(B) When a defendant testifies, his or her testimony shall not be the subject of a 
prosecution for perjury and shall not be subject to impeachment by proof of prior 
criminal convictions. 
(C) When a defendant declines to testify, his or her failure to explain incriminat-
ing circumstances may be considered by the finder of fact for any rational infer-
ence that it yields, and trial participants may comment upon this failure at argu-
ment as they could upon other circumstances of the case. 
No member of the Supreme Court at the time of Griffin v. California is still on the 
Court, and today's Court might not be notably sympathetic to the Griffin ruling. By ex-
empting a defendant's testimony from the threat of a perjury prosecution, however, the 
suggested statute would provide a substantial basis for distinguishing Griffin. The 
Supreme Court might therefore pennit comment on a defendant's silence without over-
ruling Griffin. If the suggested statute were enacted, prosecutors would be wise to use 
the power that it confers sparingly until its constitutionality had been tested. 
The proposed exemption of the defendant's testimony from impeachment by proof 
of prior convictions (afforded by subsection (B) of the statute) would remove a substan-
tial impediment to many defendants' exercise of the right to present a defense - an im-
pediment that in practice deprives fact finders of more infonnation than it gives them. 
This exemption would not preclude the use of prior convictions as substantive evidence. 
Cf. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
198 Stat 1796 § 40141, 108 Stat. 1796, 1918-19 (amending Rule 404(b) of the Federal 
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The history of the privilege against self-incrimination may raise as 
many questions for modern courts as it answers, but if a state legisla-
ture were to approve a procedure like this one, a court could take much 
of its guidance from the past. Because this procedure would require a 
showing of solidly grounded suspicion before interrogation could begin, 
it would be consistent with the maxim Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum as 
that maxim was understood in the ius commune and as it was enforced 
by the common law courts against the High Commission. The proce-
dure also would be consistent with the original understanding of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege, for the Framers saw no tension between the 
privilege and their own interrogation practices - practices that differed 
from the proposal only in that they lacked some of its safeguards. Fi-
nally, the procedure would be consistent with the principles of ordinary 
morality articulated by Kent Greenawalt. When neither text, history, nor 
sensible policy condemns a practice, a court should find it constitu-
tional; and if the practice seems inconsistent with the right to remain si-
lent, courts should read the Constitution again. With· the help of history 
and of ordinary morality, they should look at what the Fifth 
Amendment really says. 
Rules of Evidence to permit proof of prior offenses in sexual assault cases). The propri-
ety of using prior convictions to impeach a defendant's testimony warrants greater con-
sideration than an article on a different subject can provide. I raise the issue only be-
cause a legislature could not fairly encourage defendants to testify without reexamining 
it. 
